

FOURTH CAADP
BIENNIAL REVIEW
BRIEF
ZAMBIA



**Africa Agriculture
Transformation Scorecard:
Performance and Lessons**

Africa Agriculture Transformation Scorecard: Performance and Lessons

Fourth CAADP Biennial Review Brief: Zambia

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About ReSAKSS

Established in 2006 under the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), the Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System (ReSAKSS) supports efforts to promote evidence- and outcome-based policy planning and implementation. In particular, ReSAKSS provides data and related analytical and knowledge products to facilitate CAADP benchmarking, review, and mutual learning processes.

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The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of AKADEMIYA2063 or the Gates Foundation.

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1. Introduction

Agricultural-led growth has been identified by African Heads of State and Governments as key to realizing food security and accelerating rural development in Africa South of the Sahara. As in many developing countries worldwide, agriculture is the backbone of Zambia's rural economy. Zambia's agricultural sector is recognized as a key driver anchoring the country's economic growth agenda (MoF 2022). However, growth of this key sector only averaged 0.4 percent between 2011 and 2020. This poor growth can be attributed to the sector's heavy dependence on rain-fed crop production, low productivity levels, limited mechanization among smallholder farmers, and low adoption rates of climate-smart farming practices. Another contributing factor may be the Government of Zambia's limited expenditure (less than 10 percent of the annual budget) on the agricultural sector.

The African Union's (AU) Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP) calls on all governments on the continent to allocate at least 10 percent of their national budget toward agriculture in order to achieve at least 6 percent annual agricultural growth. Zambia signed the CAADP compact in January 2011 and embraced the program's commitment to targeting sustained economic growth through effective investments in the agricultural sector.

In 2014, Zambia, like many other AU Member States, recommitted itself to the CAADP framework by endorsing the Malabo Declaration (AUC 2014). This outlines the vision of Africa's leaders to accelerate agricultural growth and transformation on the continent between 2015 and 2025. This transformation is to be achieved through the pursuit of seven broad Commitments:

1. Upholding the principles and values of the CAADP
2. Enhancing investment finance in agriculture
3. Ending hunger in Africa by 2025
4. Halving poverty by 2025 through inclusive agricultural growth and transformation
5. Boosting intra-African trade in agricultural commodities and services
6. Enhancing the resilience of livelihoods and production systems to climate variability and related risks
7. Ensuring mutual accountability for actions and results by conducting a continent-wide Biennial Review (BR) to monitor progress in achieving the seven Malabo Declaration Commitments

Based on the seventh Commitment on ensuring mutual accountability, the African Union Commission (AUC) launched the BR reporting mechanism to assess the continent's progress toward achieving the Malabo Commitments by 2025. The first BR report (BR1) was developed in 2017 and presented at the AU summit held in 2018 (AUC 2018). In 2019, the second BR report (BR2) was produced and adopted at the AU Summit in 2020 (AUC 2020). In February 2022, African Heads of State and Government endorsed the third BR report (BR3) during the 35th AU Assembly (AUC 2022). In February 2024, the fourth BR report (BR4) was presented by the Prime Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (who is also the CAADP Champion) and endorsed by African Heads of State and Government during the 37th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly.

This brief highlights Zambia's performance in BR4 and compares this to the country's performance in BR1, BR2, and BR3. We also discuss challenges and lessons learned during the fourth BR. Further, the brief reviews policy, programmatic, and investment changes in Zambia that are attributable to the BRs and concludes by highlighting the measures Zambia needs to take to meet all seven Malabo Commitments by 2025.



2. Zambia's Progress Toward Achieving the Malabo Declaration Commitments

In BR4, Zambia attained a score of 4.41 for its overall performance toward the achievement of the Malabo Declaration Commitments by 2025 (Figure 1). For a country to be considered on track to achieving the Commitments by 2025, it had to meet or exceed the BR4 benchmark score of 9.29. These results imply that Zambia is not on track. Further, the country saw a 22 percent decline in its performance between BR3 and BR4.

Figure 1: Zambia's overall performance in BR4 relative to other African countries

Against the 2022 benchmark of 9.29 out of 10, which is the minimum score for a country to be on track towards achieving the CAADP Malabo goals and targets by 2025, countries whose score appears in "green" are **ON TRACK**, countries whose score appears in "blue" are **PROGRESSING WELL** (score of 5 or greater out of 10 but less than the benchmark), while countries whose score appears in "red" are **NOT ON TRACK**. The arrows with percentages indicate the progress made by the country between the third (2021) and the fourth (2023) biennial review cycles.


									2022 BENCHMARK	ALGERIA
									9.29	NA
ANGOLA	BENIN	BOTSWANA	BURKINA FASO	BURUNDI	CABO VERDE	CAMEROON	CENTRAL AFRICAN REP.	CHAD		
1.43 ▽ -62%	6.00 △ 26%	3.14 ▽ -37%	5.73 △ 10%	6.14 △ 14%	5.09 △ 12%	3.70 ▽ -19%	1.73 ▽ -34%	NA		
COMOROS	CONGO	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	DJIBOUTI	DR CONGO	EGYPT	EQUATORIAL GUINEA	ERITREA	ESWATINI		
3.20 △ 113%	2.90 ▽ -13%	3.96 ▽ -14%	3.82 ▽ -5%	NA	6.83 △ 5%	3.30 △ 17%	NA	5.63 ▽ -2%		
ETHIOPIA	GABON	GAMBIA	GHANA	GUINEA	GUINEA-BISSAU	KENYA	LESOTHO	LIBERIA		
6.01 ▽ -0%	4.79 ▽ -4%	5.79 △ 4%	6.68 △ 1%	4.11 △ 2%	2.75 △ 26%	6.28 △ 12%	4.16 △ 5%	3.46 ▽ -12%		
LIBYA	MADAGASCAR	MALAWI	MALI	MAURITANIA	MAURITIUS	MOROCCO	MOZAMBIQUE	NAMIBIA		
0.58 ▽ -49%	4.83 △ 11%	5.25 ▽ -2%	6.51 ▽ -2%	4.27 ▽ -21%	3.77 ○	6.99 △ 1.5%	4.64 △ 12%	4.26 △ 4%		
NIGER	NIGERIA	REP. A. SAHARAWI	RWANDA	SÃO TOME & PRÍNCIPE	SENEGAL	SEYCHELLES	SIERRA LEONE	SOMALIA		
4.32 △ 19%	6.28 △ 16%	0.43 ○	8.07 △ 9%	NA	4.06 ▽ -20%	2.69 ▽ -45%	5.90 △ 36%	2.49 ○		
SOUTH AFRICA	SOUTH SUDAN	SUDAN	TANZANIA	TOGO	TUNISIA	UGANDA	ZAMBIA	ZIMBABWE		
4.11 △ 1%	3.51 △ 22%	NA	5.76 ▽ -6%	4.80 △ 3%	6.23 ▽ -1%	6.76 △ 15%	4.41 ▽ -22%	5.45 △ 5%		

Source: BR 4 results (AUC 2024).

Note: The 2022 benchmark for overall performance was 9.929, which is the minimum score under the fourth BR for a country to be considered on track towards achieving the Malabo Commitments by 2025. Countries whose score appears in green are on track (no country was on track); countries whose score appears in blue are progressing well, with a score of 5.00 or greater, but less than the benchmark (19 in total); while countries whose score appears in red are not on-track (30 in total). The arrows with percentages indicate the progress made by the country between BR3 (2021) and BR4 (2023).

In terms of regional performance, Figure 2 shows that, except for BR1, Zambia's overall performance was above the average score for countries in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and the Southern African region. Zambia's performance in BR4 declined by 20 percent from BR3 in 2021. However, the country's performance improved by an impressive 54 percent between BR1 and BR3.


Figure 2: Zambia's BR4 scores relative to regional averages for Southern Africa countries, by Malabo commitment



Source: Authors' computations using BR data.

Zambia's performance in BR4 was unsatisfactory as it was not on track to achieve the Malabo Commitments by 2025. Similarly, no SADC country was on track in BR4. However, Zambia's overall score of 4.41 on all Commitments was above the average score (4.25) for countries in the Southern Africa region and the average score (4.27) for countries in the SADC region (Figure 3).

Figure 3: Zambia's BR4 scores relative to the average for Southern Africa and SADC countries by Malabo Commitments




Source: Authors' computations using BR data.

Note: The Southern Africa region is made up of Angola, Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. SADC is made up of Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

A comparison of Zambia's performance on the seven Commitments across the four BRs is presented in Figure 4. In BR1, the country was on track on two of the seven Commitments: (Theme 1) Recommitment to CAADP and (Theme 7) Mutual accountability. For BR2, the country was similarly on track in only two of the seven Commitments: (Theme 5) Boosting

intra-African trade and (Theme 7) Mutual accountability. In BR3, Zambia was on track for only one commitment: (Theme 2) Enhancing investment finance in agriculture. The country was not on track with all seven Commitments in BR4, and this was largely due to data gaps and lack of investment in data generation.

Figure 4: Summary of Zambia's BR scores by Malabo Commitments



Source: Author's computations using BR data.

In terms of its overall performance, Zambia has not been on track across all four BRs. However, its overall performance score has increased with each successive round except for BR4. Generally, Zambia has seen some consistent improvements in its performance on (Theme 1) Recommitment to CAADP; (Theme 2) Enhancing agricultural finance; (Theme 3) Ending hunger by 2025; and (Theme 6) Enhancing resilience to climate change.

Some of Zambia's scores declined between BR3 and BR4. However, the country's alignment with the Malabo Declaration Commitments of the CAADP appeared to improve performance on Commitment 3 (Ending hunger by 2025). Zambia also needs to participate more in intra-Africa trade flows, especially in agricultural commodities and services. In 2021, the country made efforts to boost such trade by ratifying its participation in the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and the Tripartite Free Trade Area within the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), and SADC countries. Finally, Zambia put in place all of the inclusive institutionalized mechanisms and platforms for mutual accountability and peer review that are expected under Commitment 7.

One area that needs attention is the translation of Zambia's agricultural potential to meaningful economic growth and development. This is partly because public investments in agriculture have not diversified away from inefficient input subsidies mainly focused on maize, Zambia's staple crop. These subsidies comprise the bulk of the agricultural budget. In 2021, the two agricultural subsidy programs, the Farmer Input Support Programme and the Food Reserve Agency captured 86 percent of the total budget for the Ministry of Agriculture (Kuteya and Chapoto 2020). One consequence of these maize production and marketing subsidies is the crowding out of private-sector investments in agriculture. Unfortunately, these investments in maize production and marketing inputs have still not addressed high rural poverty levels and low productivity among smallholder farmers in Zambia.

Another area that requires attention is agricultural research and development (R&D). Public spending in this area was 0.4 percent of agricultural gross domestic product (AgGDP) in BR3, while the AU target for this indicator is at least one percent of the country's AgGDP.

3. Challenges and Lessons Learned from BR4 in Zambia

Some notable challenges were experienced during the preparation and compilation of BR4 in Zambia. The most serious of these were data gaps. Some of the data required for BR4 were either unavailable or inaccessible if they had been collected. Examples of such data gaps include the share of the agricultural population with secure land rights, information on post-harvest losses, and the proportion of rural women who are empowered in agriculture. Further, data on the share of agricultural land under sustainable land management (SLM) could not be obtained.

4. Policy and Programmatic Changes in Zambia Following the Four BRs

Zambia has made several changes to its agricultural sector in terms of policy, procedures, and investment levels. These changes can partially be attributed to the results of the previous three BR cycles (Matchaya et al. 2022). For example, the first and third BR reports were shared with all agricultural sector stakeholders in the country. Several non-state actors who attended the dissemination of the BR3 report also worked with the Ministry of Agriculture to publicize the results in both print and electronic national media.

Budgetary allocations to agriculture as a share of total national public expenditure have been increasing. This could partly be attributed to the BR results. While Zambia's level of public investment in agriculture was above the regional average, it was still below the CAADP target of 10 percent. To further improve its performance on the Malabo Commitments, Zambia is improving access to agricultural financial services for men and women engaged in farming, as well as access to agricultural inputs and technologies.

To provide additional support to small-scale farmers and create conditions for them to contribute more effectively to the growth of the agricultural sector, Zambia's government has implemented the Comprehensive Agriculture Transformation Support Programme (CATSP). At the 2024 launch of the CATSP, Zambia's Vice-President, Ms. Mutale Nalumango, said, "The program aims to boost agricultural productivity and enhance resilience among farmers facing climate change impacts." This program seeks to improve agricultural production and productivity among small-scale farmers through the provision of farm inputs using an electronic system.

Another notable change that the country put in place following the first three BRs was a review of the first-generation National Agriculture Investment Plan (NAIP) which was implemented from 2014 to 2018 and has since expired. Development of a second-generation NAIP started in 2020, and the new plan is earmarked to run until 2026. The NAIP plays a key role in accelerating sound and sustainable transformational changes in the agricultural sector. It is also critical in fulfilling national Commitments made by Zambia under the 2014 Malabo Declaration. The second NAIP will build on lessons learned from the first and include more effective investment strategies to achieve Zambia's agricultural development goals.

Zambia's government recognizes the effects of climate change and the risks to the agricultural sector. The government therefore promotes conservation agriculture methods to enhance climate change resilience among smallholder farmers. Other actions that the government is taking to address climate change include formulating a national policy on climate change and drafting a national adaptation plan of action that incorporates appropriate mitigation actions, as well as the national climate change response strategy. Climate change was also integrated into Zambia's Seventh Development Plan (2017-2021) and the country's medium-term development objectives.



Zambia is making efforts to end hunger by 2025 by providing increased support to social protection initiatives within the national budget and taking steps to address those disasters and emergencies with food and nutrition security implications. For example, budgetary allocations to social protection through cash transfers for food and the strengthening of household cash reserves increased almost six-fold from Zambian Kwacha (ZMW) 180 million (US\$ 7 million) in 2015 to about ZMW 1.05 billion (about US\$42 million) in 2020 and then to ZMW 3.7 billion in 2023. This way, the government hopes to achieve its objective of building resilience and promoting sustainable development among the poor and vulnerable, especially those in rural areas, with particular attention to women, unemployed youths, and people with disabilities.

5. Priority Actions and Recommendations to Ensure Achievement of the Malabo Declaration Commitments by 2025

Although the country's performance improved in four of the seven Malabo Declaration commitment areas between BR2 in 2019 and BR3 in 2021, performance declined between BR3 and BR4. Overall, the country is not on track to achieve the Malabo Commitments by 2025. Zambia should consider implementing the following key priority actions to accelerate its progress toward achieving the Malabo Commitments:

- Expand the share of national budget allocations to agriculture to meet the CAADP target of 10 percent. Sufficient public resources must be directed toward agriculture to realize accelerated growth and transformation of the agricultural sector.
- Increase resources to support the key drivers of agricultural growth, including research and development, extension services, market information, irrigation for smallholder farmers, and feeder roads. All have great potential to stimulate agricultural growth.
- In addition to increasing the budgetary allocations to agriculture, the government should improve the timeliness with which it releases funds for agricultural program implementation. Delayed budget releases hinder the smooth implementation of planned activities.
- Increase public-private partnerships (PPPs) within agricultural commodity value chains. Zambia's government should finalize the Agri-Public-Private Partnership Guidelines that are being developed to facilitate the implementation of PPPs in agriculture.
- The government should also ensure that the new, second-generation NAIP being developed is fully compliant with the Malabo Declaration.
- Zambia's government should consider increasing the expenditure used to develop and promote the adoption of modern agricultural technologies for improved food production and productivity, as well as the prevention of post-harvest losses. Reduced post-harvest losses and improvements in the nutritional value of food can be realized by promoting value-addition processing of agricultural products.
- The main objective of the AfCFTA is to create a liberalized market to facilitate intra-African trade (AUC 2018; World Bank 2020). To improve Zambia's performance on Commitment 5 (Boosting intra-African trade in agricultural commodities and services), the government should promote the export of processed agricultural products, revise its tax regime to enhance the competitiveness of Zambian exporters within the region, reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, and improve roads to expedite the transportation of goods.
- Improving performance on all Commitments requires increased funding for data generation, management, analysis, utilization, and monitoring and evaluation in the agricultural sector. The utilization of BR results can be enhanced by involving high-level political leadership in their dissemination. Zambia can also improve its progress toward these Commitments by developing an electronic application to conduct national self-assessments.

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