


**2021 CAADP**  
**BIENNIAL REVIEW**  
**BRIEF**  
**SOUTH AFRICA**



**Africa Agriculture  
Transformation Scorecard:  
Performance and Lessons**

# Africa Agriculture Transformation Scorecard: Performance and Lessons

## 2021 CAADP Biennial Review Brief: South Africa

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### About ReSAKSS

Established in 2006 under the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), the Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System (ReSAKSS) supports efforts to promote evidence- and outcome-based policy planning and implementation. In particular, ReSAKSS provides data and related analytical and knowledge products to facilitate CAADP benchmarking, review, and mutual learning processes. AKADEMIYA2063 leads the work of ReSAKSS in partnership with the African Union Commission, the African Union Development Agency-NEPAD (AUDA-NEPAD), and leading regional economic communities (RECs).

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# 1. Introduction

The Malabo Declaration outlines the vision of Africa's leaders for accelerating agricultural growth and transformation on the continent between 2015 and 2025 (AUC 2014). This transformation is to be achieved through the pursuit of seven broad commitments:

1. Upholding the principles and values of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP),
2. Enhancing investment finance in agriculture,
3. Ending hunger in Africa by 2025,
4. Reducing poverty by half by 2025 through inclusive agricultural growth and transformation,
5. Boosting intra-African trade in agricultural commodities and services,
6. Enhancing resilience of livelihoods and production systems to climate variability and related risks, and
7. Ensuring mutual accountability for actions and results by conducting a Biennial Review (BR) continent-wide to monitor progress in achieving the seven Malabo Declaration commitments.

As part of fulfilling the seventh commitment on mutual accountability, the third CAADP BR report was endorsed by the assembly of African Heads of State and Government at the 35<sup>th</sup> African Union (AU) Summit in February 2022 (AUC 2021). This brief draws on that report to summarize the performance of the nation of South Africa in pursuit of the seven Malabo Declaration commitments and assesses the challenges faced and the lessons learned by the country. The brief also reviews policy, programmatic, and investment changes in South Africa induced by the inaugural BR of 2017 (AUC 2018), the second BR of 2019 (AUC 2020), and the most recent BR. The final section of the brief highlights policy actions and programmatic measures South Africa must take for it to meet its Malabo Declaration commitments by 2025.

## 2. Progress by South Africa in Achieving the Malabo Commitments

For the third BR, the benchmark score, the minimum score for a country to be considered on-track to achieve the Malabo Declaration commitments by 2025, was 7.28 (AUC 2021). The benchmark score for the third BR is an increase over both the second BR, for which the benchmark was 6.66, and the first BR's benchmark of 3.94. South Africa's overall performance score for the first BR surpassed the benchmark, so the country was on-track to achieve the Malabo commitments at that time. However, the second BR found the country was no longer on-track, with an overall score of 2.88, below the 6.66 second BR benchmark score. For the third BR South Africa attained an overall score of 4.05, far below the third BR benchmark of 7.28. South Africa is considered not on-track to achieve the Malabo commitments by 2025. Moreover, the overall performance score for South Africa has been relatively stagnant, if not declining, across the successive BRs, with the lowest performance registered in the second BR. In addition, the overall performance scores for the second and third BRs for South Africa are disappointingly low at less than 60 percent of their benchmarks.



**Table 1. South Africa—summary of Biennial Review scores by Malabo commitment**

Malabo commitment	First BR (2017)			Second BR (2019)			Third BR (2021)			% change, 3 <sup>rd</sup> BR-2 <sup>nd</sup> BR
	Score	Bench-mark	Progress	Score	Bench-mark	Progress	Score	Bench-mark	Progress	
1. Recommitment to CAADP	3.52	3.33	On track	5.71	10.00	Not on-track	6.02	10.00	Not on-track	5
2. Enhancing agriculture finance	2.46	6.67	Not on track	0.43	10.00	Not on-track	3.32	7.50	Not on-track	670
3. Ending hunger by 2025	3.02	3.71	Not on track	0.83	5.04	Not on track	3.94	6.32	Not on-track	375
4. Halving poverty through agriculture	3.30	2.06	On track	0.00	3.94	Not on track	0.36	5.81	Not on-track	--
5. Intra-Africa trade in agriculture	3.79	1.00	On track	1.31	3.00	Not on track	2.94	5.00	Not on-track	124
6. Enhancing resilience to climate change	3.35	6.00	Not on track	0.30	7.00	Not on track	3.33	8.00	Not on-track	1,010
7. Mutual accountability	9.09	4.78	Not on track	8.50	6.67	On track	8.42	8.33	Not on-track	-1
All commitments	4.07	3.94	Not on track	2.88	6.66	Not on track	4.05	7.28	Not on-track	41

**Source:** Authors' calculations based on South Africa Biennial Review scores.

In the third BR, South Africa only performed well on one of the seven commitments—that on mutual accountability, for which it is on-track to achieve this Malabo commitment by 2025. This result was not surprising, as the country has been performing well on this commitment over all three BRs to date. However, for the other six commitments, South Africa was found in the third BR to be not on-track to achieve them by 2025.

Across the three BR rounds, South Africa's best performance overall was in the first round of 2017. It was on-track in the first BR on four commitments—those on CAADP, on halving poverty, on intra-Africa trade, and on mutual accountability—and overall. However, in both the second and third BRs, the country remained on-track only on the commitment on mutual accountability. South Africa's overall performance score in the third BR was 41 percent higher than it was in the second BR. However, while this is encouraging, the overall performance score for the third BR was slightly lower than the overall performance score South Africa achieved in the first BR. In the period between the second BR in 2019 and the third BR in 2021, dishearteningly, South Africa only recovered in its progress toward achieving the seven Malabo commitments to where it was at the time of the first BR in 2017.

**Table 2. South Africa—third Biennial Review scores relative to average for Southern Africa countries, by Malabo commitment**

Malabo commitment	South Africa Third BR	South Africa status	Third BR Benchmark	Southern Africa avg.
1. Recommitment to CAADP	6.02	Not on-track	10.00	6.55
2. Enhancing agriculture finance	3.32	Not on-track	7.50	3.94
3. Ending hunger by 2025	3.94	Not on-track	6.32	2.79
4. Halving poverty through agriculture	0.36	Not on-track	5.81	1.43
5. Intra-Africa trade in agriculture	2.94	Not on-track	5.00	2.35
6. Enhancing resilience to climate change	3.33	Not on-track	8.00	5.58
7. Mutual accountability	8.42	On-track	8.33	6.14
All commitments	4.05	Not on-track	7.28	4.11

**Note:** The Southern Africa region is made up of Angola, Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

South Africa's overall performance score of 4.05 in the third BR is far below the continental average of 7.28 and even somewhat below the average for all countries in Southern Africa of 4.11 (Table 2). However, similar to South Africa itself, most countries in Southern Africa are not performing sufficiently well across the seven Malabo commitments to be on-track to achieve them by 2025. The average commitment scores for all countries in Southern Africa are below their benchmarks. South Africa did perform somewhat better than other countries in Southern Africa on the commitments on ending hunger (although below the benchmark) and on mutual accountability, but worse on halving poverty and on enhancing resilience to climate change.

### 3. Challenges and Lessons Learned from the Third Biennial Review in South Africa

South Africa has experienced challenges since 2017 in documenting its progress toward achieving the Malabo Declaration commitments. The country has to pay more attention to the availability of data needed for the BRs and to the quality of the data that is available. South Africa had missing information for several BR indicators, including on agricultural productivity, input use, technology adoption, food security, nutrition, and intra-African trade, among others. In computing the commitment-level and overall performance scores for the BRs, zero is applied when there is missing data. Consequently, the non-availability of key data has implications on the poor performance for several Malabo commitments recorded for South Africa in the third BR. The third BR assessment revealed that countries with relatively good agricultural data management systems produced better reports for the BR process.

Further aligning and implementing policies and programs based on CAADP principles will enable South Africa to make considerable progress toward achieving the Malabo commitments by 2025. The third BR showed that South Africa is making some progress, including in building capacity to generate and use agriculture statistics; reducing post-harvest losses for agricultural commodities; improving food safety systems; facilitating greater trade flows, and strengthening agricultural markets, as shown by consistently low values recently on the Indicator of Food Price Anomalies for the country. However, South Africa also has to pay more attention to the areas of weakness revealed in the third BR, such as limited growth in agricultural GDP; low agricultural value-added per unit of arable land; farmers' poor access to agriculture advisory services; undernourishment in the population; and limited allocations from the government budget on climate change resilience building initiatives.

### 4. Policy and Programmatic Changes in South Africa following the First Three Biennial Reviews

South Africa made important programmatic changes in the lead-up to the third BR. Even though the country did not meet the third BR benchmark for its overall performance in making progress toward achieving the Malabo commitments, South Africa made good progress on the commitments in the following areas:

- **Recommitment to the CAADP process:** The government of South Africa introduced some programmatic changes to improve on this commitment. The country developed an Agriculture and Agro-processing Master Plan, which is a multi-stakeholder social compact that involves government, labor, civil society, both the emerging and the commercial agriculture sectors, businesses, and the banking sector. It also finalized commodity-specific master plans for the poultry and sugar industries. In terms of policy initiatives and institutional support, South Africa reconfigured several government departments to promote greater coherence, better coordination, and improved efficiency. Furthermore, functional reviews were done across departments to identify overlaps and cross-cutting functions.



- **Enhancing agriculture finance:** Potato South Africa, the industry's coordinating body, has engaged with both agricultural cooperatives and government departments to ensure that farmers have the access to the agricultural finance they require. Through its Smallholder Enterprise Development Programme, Potato South Africa targets financial support to potato farmers with the potential to be commercial in the future.
- **Ending hunger by 2025:** Despite the country not being on-track on this commitment, several programmatic changes have been made to address hunger in South Africa. The government implemented programs to provide improved access for farmers to inputs and technologies, such as the Solidarity Fund and Presidential Employment Stimulus Package. To expand agricultural research and development efforts, the government strengthened its partnership with several parastatal organizations responsible for research funding. To guide direct actions to reduce food insecurity and improve nutrition, South Africa formulated the National Food and Nutrition Security Plan, 2018-2023. Its overall implementation is led by the Presidency with specific interventions to achieve targets for the plan being implemented by dedicated social clusters made up of government departments and other stakeholders. In 2020, the Department of Agriculture, in partnership with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), conducted a rapid assessment on the impact of COVID19 on food and nutrition security in South Africa.
- **Halving poverty through agriculture by 2025:** The government of South Africa implemented several poverty-reduction initiatives, particularly through public-private partnerships. For instance, the National Animal Health Forum is a partnership between the government and various livestock and animal product commodity organizations. Similarly, a partnership has been formed between South Africa's wool industry and provincial Veterinary Departments for the certification of wool for export. To support the welfare of youth, the government launched an initiative to provide youth with farm inputs, including seeds and seedlings, fertilizer, protective clothing, and packaging materials. Included in this program is assistance to youth to enter formal markets in which to sell their produce. Women groups similarly have been supported by facilitating their registration as cooperatives and by providing them with production inputs and skills training.
- **Boosting intra-African trade in agricultural commodities and services:** To accelerate progress toward achieving this commitment, the South African government has established online visas that will facilitate the process for citizens of other African countries to gain entry to South Africa. Additional points of entry will soon be announced. The government also established an Industrial Development Zones program as part of its strategy to raise the profile of South Africa in the world economy. To facilitate trade, Transnet Port Terminals, the ocean port operations arm of South Africa's state-owned freight transport company, obtained depot licenses from the South African Revenue Services for its multipurpose terminals to permit the packing and unpacking of containers for all commodities. This expanded port function should facilitate trade in South Africa's agricultural commodities.
- **Enhancing resilience to climate change:** As South Africa is not on-track on this commitment, several programs have been established to improve its performance. These include the drafting of a Climate-smart Agriculture Strategic Framework and a Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Plan for the country. The Department of Agriculture has established departmental policies related to climate change, including guidance on their implementation by the provinces. The policies cover adaptation and mitigation mechanisms, research and education, and awareness-raising and capacity-building programs.



## 5. South Africa—Priority Actions and Recommendations for Ensuring Achievement of Malabo Commitments by 2025

To improve progress toward the achievement of the Malabo Declaration commitments by 2025, South Africa needs to implement the following recommendations:

- **Recommitment to the CAADP process:** South Africa should improve on the overall CAADP process and the CAADP-based policy and institutional support system. The country was not on-track on this commitment in the third BR. The country fell short on most indicators relating to this commitment, including the CAADP process completion index; the existence and the quality of a multi-sector and multi-stakeholder coordination body; and having in place evidence-based policies, supportive institutions, and corresponding human resources required. This poor performance is worrisome, as the country also was not on-track on this commitment in the second BRs.
- **Enhancing agriculture finance:** The country struggled to improve access to agriculture finance for farmers. It was not on-track on this commitment in the third BR. Despite being on-track on achieving domestic private sector investment in agriculture, a component of this commitment, less than 10 percent of public expenditure in South Africa went to agriculture. The country must also improve on value addition in agriculture. Most of the data on this indicator was missing for 2019 and 2020, which partly explains its poor performance on this commitment. South Africa also has not met the benchmark target on the share of men and women engaged in farming with access to financial services—a pattern seen across all three BRs. To improve its performance in the next BR, the country needs to focus on lagging components of this agriculture finance commitment.
- **Ending hunger by 2025:** South Africa performed poorly across the various components of the Malabo hunger commitment in the third BR. This was also the case for the first and second BRs. The country must pay more attention to components for sharply reducing and eventually ending hunger if it is to be on-track for achieving this commitment in the next BR. South African farmers were found to have very poor access to agriculture inputs and technologies—this component registered a score of 0.26 against a benchmark of 7.92. Fertilizer consumption is declining, resulting in a decline in food crop production. On the agricultural productivity component of this commitment, South Africa only scored 0.51 against a benchmark of 5.00. Little, if any, progress was also found on expansion of the area under irrigation and in better supplying the needs of farmers for inputs. This extends to the provision to farmers of agricultural advisory services—South Africa's score on this component was only about 10 percent of the benchmark expected for the third BR. For other components, data was missing, so performance levels of zero were registered—this includes zeros for the components on total agricultural research spending, on reduction of post-harvest losses, and on the share of farmers with ownership or secure rights over the land they farm.
- **Halving poverty through agriculture by 2025:** South Africa only managed to be on-track on this commitment in the first BR. Its performance has been declining since. Among the components of this commitment that require sharply increased attention are growth in agriculture value-added; reducing the poverty headcount, however measured; reducing the gap between farmgate and wholesale prices for agricultural commodities; and increasing the number of commodity value chains for which have been established public-private partnerships with strong linkages to smallholder farmers. In addition, the country must see improvements in the empowerment of youth and women if progress on alleviating poverty is to be seen.



- **Boosting intra-African trade in agricultural commodities and services:** In the third BR, South Africa was not on-track to achieve this trade commitment by 2025. Despite having a Trade Facilitation Index above 50 percent and having implemented some relevant programs, the country achieved low growth in the value of trade of agricultural commodities and services with other African countries. Hence, it was not on-track on this indicator in the third BR. Much of the data required for evaluating South Africa's performance on this commitment is missing, which contributes to the poor performance it registered on this commitment. The country needs to eliminate the data gaps on these indicators if it is to improve its performance at the time of the next BR.
- **Enhancing resilience to climate change:** Despite formulating agriculture-focused climate change adaptation and mitigation policies and strategies, South Africa was not on-track on this commitment for the third BR, just as it was not on-track for the first and second. An important reason for this poor performance is that South Africa does not provide sufficient public investment to efforts aimed at building resilience to climate change—the country managed to provide sufficient funding for only two-thirds of the resilience-building actions that appeared in the government budget. South Africa must invest more in building resilience to climate change.

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