



CHAPTER 16

# Tracking Key CAADP Indicators and Implementation Processes

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In 2003, African Union (AU) leaders adopted the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) as part of the Maputo Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security. In the declaration, the leaders committed to reducing poverty, food insecurity, and hunger; revitalizing the agriculture sector; and allocating at least 10 percent of national budgets to the agriculture sector (AU 2003). As part of the CAADP agenda, leaders also pledged to achieve a 6 percent agricultural growth rate at the national level. The need for a common framework to demonstrate CAADP implementation progress and performance led to the development of a CAADP monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system starting in 2007. At the behest of the African Union Commission (AUC), the Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System (ReSAKSS) led the development of the CAADP M&E framework, which identified key indicators for tracking progress in allocating resources and achieving targets; outlined the required data, sources, and methods for estimating the indicators; and laid out a plan for successfully implementing the framework (see Benin, Johnson, and Omilola 2010). ReSAKSS was established in 2006 to provide data and knowledge products to facilitate CAADP benchmarking, review, dialogue, and mutual learning processes.

Following a decade of implementation, African leaders reaffirmed their commitment to CAADP in the 2014 Malabo Declaration on Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Transformation for Shared Prosperity and Improved Livelihoods. In the Malabo Declaration, they made seven wide-ranging commitments, including upholding the CAADP principles and values, enhancing investment in agriculture, ending hunger and halving poverty by 2025, boosting intra-African agricultural trade, enhancing resilience to climate variability, and strengthening mutual accountability for actions and results by conducting a continental Biennial Review (BR) of progress made in achieving the commitments (AUC 2014). In 2015, the AUC and the African Union Development Agency–New Partnership for Africa’s Development (AUDA-NEPAD) developed the CAADP Results Framework (RF) for 2015–2025, which is aligned with the seven Malabo commitments and organized by three levels of inputs, outputs, and outcomes (AUC and NPCA 2015). ReSAKSS tracks progress on CAADP indicators in the CAADP RF for 2015–2025 through its flagship Annual Trends and Outlook Report (ATOR) and website ([www.resakss.org](http://www.resakss.org)).

Level 1 of the CAADP RF includes broader development outcomes and impacts to which agriculture contributes, including wealth creation; food and

nutrition security; enhanced economic opportunities, poverty alleviation, and shared prosperity; and resilience and sustainability. Level 2 includes the outputs from interventions intended to transform the agriculture sector and achieve inclusive growth: improved agricultural production and productivity; increased intra-African trade and functional markets; expanded local agro-industry and value chain development, inclusive of women and youth; increased resilience of livelihoods and improved management of risks in agriculture; and improved management of natural resources for sustainable agriculture. Level 3 includes inputs and processes required to strengthen systemic capacity to deliver CAADP results and create an enabling environment in which agricultural transformation can take place: effective and inclusive policy processes; effective and accountable institutions that regularly assess the quality of implementation of policies and commitments; strengthened capacity for evidence-based planning, implementation, and review; improved multisectoral coordination, partnerships, and mutual accountability in sectors related to agriculture; increased public and private

**TABLE 16.1—NUMBER OF INDICATORS IN THE CAADP RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND BIENNIAL REVIEW**

CAADP Results Framework	Number of indicators
Level 1: Agriculture’s contribution to growth and development	14
Level 2: Agricultural transformation and inclusive growth	12
Level 3: Systemic capacity to deliver results	12
<b>Total number of indicators</b>	<b>38</b>
CAADP Biennial Review and Africa Agriculture Transformation Scorecard	Number of indicators
Theme 1: CAADP processes and values	3
Theme 2: Investment finance in agriculture	6
Theme 3: Ending hunger by 2025	21
Theme 4: Halving poverty by 2025	8
Theme 5: Boosting intra-African trade in agricultural commodities and services	3
Theme 6: Enhancing resilience to climate variability	3
Theme 7: Mutual accountability for results and actions	3
<b>Total number of indicators</b>	<b>47</b>

Source: Authors based on AUC and NPCA 2015 and AUC 2014.

investments in agriculture; and increased capacity to generate, analyze, and use data, information, knowledge, and innovations. There are 38 indicators in the CAADP RF: 14 for level 1, 12 for level 2, and 12 for level 3 (Table 16.1).

Although the CAADP RF is intended to help track progress in implementing the Malabo Declaration, the CAADP BR process initiated in 2015 introduced indicators aimed at monitoring the specific commitments in the declaration using the Africa Agriculture Transformation Scorecard (AATS) (Table 16.1). Although there is considerable overlap between CAADP RF and CAADP BR indicators, some of the indicators in both the CAADP RF and the CAADP BR are not yet included in the ReSAKSS database because data are not yet consistently available at all or not available across all countries to allow for cross-country aggregation. These include several indicators on access to finance, private sector investment, postharvest loss, women's empowerment, food safety, and resilience.

## Objectives of the Chapter

This chapter discusses progress on 25 of the 38 CAADP RF indicators for which cross-country data are available (Table 16.2)—details of the indicators and aggregate statistics are available in the data tables in Annexes 1–3 of this report. Progress is discussed across different geographic and economic groupings on the continent, comparing trends in the RF indicators since the adoption of CAADP in 2003 (that is, from 2003 to 2019) with the pre-CAADP subperiod (1995 to 2003). In keeping with the policy theme of the 2020 ATOR, this chapter also discusses recent policy adjustments due to the COVID-19 pandemic in selected African countries. Starting with the next section, the chapter also discusses the CAADP implementation process itself in terms of country and regional progress in developing evidence-based, Malabo-compliant national agriculture investment plans (NAIPs) and operationalizing CAADP mutual accountability processes to support agriculture sector review and dialogue.

## Progress in CAADP Implementation Processes

Operationalizing the Malabo Declaration and the CAADP RF requires countries and regional economic communities (RECs) to develop national or regional agriculture investment plans that align with the goals and targets of the declaration. The NAIP development or updating process at the country level starts with a Malabo NAIP domestication event, led by AUC, AUDA-NEPAD, and RECs, that convenes national CAADP constituencies to discuss and agree on a country

**TABLE 16.2—CAADP RESULTS FRAMEWORK INDICATORS DISCUSSED**

<b>No. Level 1: Agriculture's contribution to economic growth and inclusive development</b>	
1	<b>L1.1.1</b> GDP per capita (constant 2010 US\$)
2	<b>L1.1.2</b> Household final consumption expenditure per capita (constant 2010 US\$)
3	<b>L1.2.1</b> Prevalence of undernourishment (% of population)
4	<b>L1.2.2a</b> Prevalence of underweight, weight for age (% of children under 5)
5	<b>L1.2.2b</b> Prevalence of stunting, height for age (% of children under 5)
6	<b>L1.2.2c</b> Prevalence of wasting, weight for height (% of children under 5)
7	<b>L1.2.3</b> Cereal import dependency index
8	<b>L1.3.1</b> Employment rate
9	<b>L1.3.3</b> Poverty gap at \$1.90 a day (2011 PPP)
10	<b>L1.3.4</b> Extreme poverty headcount ratio at \$1.90 a day (2011 PPP), % of population
<b>No. Level 2: Agricultural transformation and sustained inclusive agricultural growth</b>	
11	<b>L2.1.1</b> Agriculture value added (million, constant 2010 US\$)
12	<b>L2.1.2</b> Agriculture Production Index (2004–2006 = 100)
13	<b>L2.1.3</b> Agriculture value added per agricultural worker (constant 2010 US\$)
14	<b>L2.1.4</b> Agriculture value added per hectare of agricultural land (constant 2010 US\$)
15	<b>L2.2.1</b> Value of intra-African agricultural trade (constant 2010 US\$, million)
16	<b>L2.4.2</b> Existence of food reserves, local purchases for relief programs, early warning systems, and school feeding programs
<b>No. Level 3: Strengthening systemic capacity to deliver results</b>	
17	<b>L3.1.1</b> Existence of a new NAIP/NAFSIP developed through an inclusive and participatory process
18	<b>L3.2.1</b> Existence of inclusive institutionalized mechanisms for mutual accountability and peer review
19	<b>L3.3.1</b> Existence of and quality in the implementation of evidence-informed policies and corresponding human resources
20	<b>L3.4.1</b> Existence of a functional multisectoral and multistakeholder coordination body
21	<b>L3.4.2</b> Cumulative number of agriculture-related public-private partnerships (PPPs) that are successfully undertaken
22	<b>L3.5.1</b> Government agriculture expenditure (billion, constant 2010 US \$)
23	<b>L3.5.2</b> Government agriculture expenditure (% of total government expenditure)
24	<b>L3.5.3</b> Government agriculture expenditure (% of agriculture value added)
25	<b>L3.6.2</b> Existence of an operational country SAKSS

Source: AUC and NPCA (2015).

Note: GDP = gross domestic product; NAFSIP = national agriculture and food security investment plan; NAIP = national agriculture investment plan; PPP = purchasing power parity; SAKSS = Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System.

roadmap to review and revise the NAIP. The roadmap specifies roles, timelines, and coordination modalities needed to generate a NAIP that receives broad support from national stakeholders. To date, domestication events have been held in 25 countries (Table L3(a) in Annex 3d).

ReSAKSS, in partnership with local experts, provides analysis to inform the design of country NAIPs in the form of three main deliverables: the Malabo Status Assessment and Profile (SAP), the Malabo Goals and Milestones Report (MGM), and the Policy and Program Opportunities Report (PPO). By the end of September 2020, ReSAKSS had completed SAP reports for 31 countries and MGM reports for 25 countries (Table L3(a)). In addition, a total of 9 thematic PPO reports had been completed, as well as PPO reports for 8 countries in Central and Southern Africa: Angola, Botswana, Eswatini, Gabon, Lesotho, Namibia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The 9 thematic PPO reports covered the following areas: regional trade, value chain development, food security and nutrition, gender, climate-smart agriculture, social protection, agricultural technical vocational education and training (ATVET), and mutual accountability. All of the reports (SAP, MGM, and PPO) were shared with country NAIP teams to inform their NAIP formulation processes. Furthermore, a total of 21 African countries had drafted, reviewed, and/or validated a Malabo-compliant NAIP by the end of September 2020 (Table L3(a)).

Mutual accountability is a core principle of CAADP; it is a process by which two or more partners agree to be held responsible for commitments that they have voluntarily made to each other (OECD 2009). Agriculture joint sector reviews (JSRs) are one way of operationalizing mutual accountability at the country and regional levels. JSRs provide an inclusive, evidence-based platform for multiple stakeholders to jointly review progress; hold each other accountable for actions, results, and commitments; and based on gaps identified, agree on future implementation actions. At the request of AUC and AUDA-NEPAD, ReSAKSS has been strengthening agriculture JSRs since 2014. ReSAKSS has, to date, initiated agriculture JSR assessments in 26 countries and completed them in 21 countries (Table L3(a)). At the regional level, ReSAKSS also conducted JSR assessments for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 2015 and for the East African Community (EAC) in 2019. The assessments

evaluate the institutional and policy landscape as well as the quality of current agricultural review processes, identifying areas that need strengthening in order to help countries and RECs develop JSR processes that are regular, comprehensive, and inclusive. Outcomes of the assessments have been used to strengthen agriculture JSR processes where they exist and establish new JSRs where none exist. According to a study by Nhemachena, Matchaya, and Nhlengethwa (2017), improvements made following the assessments have resulted in expanding the scope of what is reviewed in JSRs, raising accountability standards, enhancing stakeholder engagement, and increasing active participation by nonstate actors.

The CAADP BR is another way of operationalizing mutual accountability by monitoring continental progress toward meeting Malabo Declaration commitments by 2025. To date, Africa has held two BRs, the first in 2017 and the second in 2019. The launch of each continental BR report and AATS marked important milestones in promoting mutual accountability on the African continent. For the second BR, 49 out of 55 AU member states submitted country BR reports, compared with 47 during the inaugural BR (Table L3(a)). With a higher benchmark score to assess progress in the 2019 BR, only 4 out of 49 countries are on track to achieve the Malabo commitments by 2025, compared with 20 during the 2017 BR (AUC 2020). Nonetheless, the 2019 BR report shows that 36 out of 49 reporting AU member states improved their overall agricultural transformation scores, compared with 2017 (AUC 2020).

Following the launch of the second BR report and AATS during the 33rd AU Summit, February 9–10, 2020, ReSAKSS conducted analysis of the lessons and implications of the second BR results and prepared country and regional briefs that distill findings of the second BR for country and regional learning events. Preparations for the 2021 BR began during the second half of 2020, and ReSAKSS will provide technical support to improve BR indicators, guidelines, the eBR,<sup>1</sup> and other tools; train AU member states on the BR improvements; and support countries as they compile, analyze, validate, and report on their data. ReSAKSS will also support RECs with reviewing country data and producing regional summaries, and support AUC with the production of the third continental BR report and AATS.

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1 The eBR is a web-based data entry and management tool for the BR process.

## Progress in CAADP Indicators

This section discusses Africa's performance on 25 of the 38 CAADP RF indicators for which data are available—19 quantitative and all 6 qualitative indicators, organized by the three RF levels.<sup>2</sup> Data on the 25 indicators are presented in Annexes 1–3. Unlike the qualitative indicators, which are presented primarily at the country level, progress on the quantitative indicators is presented at the aggregate level in seven different breakdowns: (1) for Africa as a whole; (2) by the AU's five geographic regions (Central, Eastern, Northern, Southern, and Western); (3) by five economic categories (countries with less favorable agricultural conditions, countries with more favorable agricultural conditions, mineral-rich countries, lower-middle-income countries, and upper-middle-income countries); (4) by the eight RECs (CEN-SAD, COMESA, EAC, ECCAS, ECOWAS, IGAD, SADC, and UMA);<sup>3</sup> (5) by the period during which countries signed the CAADP compact (CC0, CC1, CC2, and CC3);<sup>4</sup> (6) by the level or stage of CAADP implementation reached by the end of 2015 (CL0, CL1, CL2, CL3, and CL4);<sup>5</sup> and (7) by the distribution of countries in formulating first- and second-generation NAIPs (N00, N10, and N11).<sup>6</sup> Annex 4 lists countries in the various geographic, economic, and REC categories; Annex 5 lists the countries in the different groupings for CAADP compact signing or level of implementation reached; and Annex 6 lists countries by NAIP formulation category. Progress is also reported over different subperiods, with achievement in post-CAADP subperiods—that is, annual average levels over the periods 2003 to 2008, 2008 to 2014, and 2014 to 2019—compared with achievement in the pre-CAADP subperiod of 1995 to 2003.<sup>7</sup>

2 Several of these indicators are also part of the CAADP BR and AATS.

3 CEN-SAD = Community of Sahel-Saharan States; COMESA = Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa; EAC = East African Community; ECCAS = Economic Community of Central African States; ECOWAS = Economic Community of West African States; IGAD = Intergovernmental Authority on Development; SADC = Southern African Development Community; UMA = Arab Maghreb Union.

4 CC1 = group of countries that signed the compact in 2007–2009; CC2 = group of countries that signed the compact in 2010–2012; CC3 = group of countries that signed the compact in 2013–2015; CC0 = group of countries that have not yet signed a CAADP compact.

5 CL0 = group of countries that have not started the CAADP process or have not yet signed a compact; CL1 = group of countries that have signed a CAADP compact; CL2 = group of countries that have signed a compact and formulated an NAIP; CL3 = group of countries that have signed a compact, formulated an NAIP, and secured one external funding source; CL4 = group of countries that have signed a compact, formulated an NAIP, and secured more than one external funding source.

6 N00 = group of countries that have neither a first-generation NAIP (NAIP1.0) nor a second-generation NAIP (NAIP2.0); N10 = group of countries that have NAIP1.0 but do not have NAIP2.0; N11 = group of countries that have both NAIP1.0 and NAIP2.0.

7 Considering that CAADP was launched in 2003, renewed in 2008, and renewed again in 2014 with the Malabo Declaration, the years 2003, 2008, and 2014 represent important milestones. Therefore, the post-CAADP subperiods for reporting on progress use overlapping years to mark these milestones that usually occurred during the middle of the year in June, that is, 2003–2008, 2008–2014, and 2014–2019.

The discussion of trends and changes in CAADP indicators pertains to country categories or groupings as a whole and not individual countries within the categories; for example, it relates to Africa as a whole, Central Africa as a group, ECOWAS members as a group, and groups of countries categorized by their stage of CAADP implementation and NAIP formulation experience. Presenting the trends by different groups helps to determine how the implications for strengthening or maintaining desirable outcomes or for reversing undesirable outcomes may differ across the continent, without inference of causality. Unless otherwise stated, all monetary values have been converted into constant 2010 US dollar prices for intertemporal and cross-country or cross-category comparisons.

## CAADP Results Framework Level 1 Indicators: Agriculture's Contribution to Economic Growth and Inclusive Development

### Wealth Creation


Across all country groupings, real gross domestic product (GDP) growth, measured by GDP per capita, has continued to decelerate since 2008 compared with the growth achieved between 2003 and 2008. For Africa as a whole, although annual GDP per capita grew by an annual average rate of 3.3 percent in 2003–2008, it slowed to 1.2 percent in 2008–2014 and further decelerated to 0.2 percent in 2014–2019 (Figure 16.1; Table L1.1.1). The decline is linked to the recent global economic slowdown and lower commodity prices, particularly in 2016. Although several country groupings witnessed negative GDP per capita growth



during the most recent subperiod, 2014–2019, the highest growth, of at least 2.4 percent, occurred in Eastern Africa, countries with more favorable agricultural conditions (Figure 16.1), EAC countries, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) countries, and countries that have been implementing CAADP longer (CC2). In terms of levels, GDP per capita grew consistently over the review period for Africa as a whole and most of the country groupings. In particular, Africa’s GDP per capita rose from an annual average level of \$1,494 in 1995–2003 to \$1,735 in 2003–2008 and reached \$2,005 in 2014–2019. Upper-middle-income countries, the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), and countries that have not yet joined the CAADP process (CC0 and CL0) registered the highest levels of annual average GDP per capita, of more than \$4,000, in 2014–2019. Over the same period, countries with less and more favorable agricultural conditions and mineral-rich countries recorded the lowest levels of GDP per capita, of less than \$700 per year (Table L1.1.1).

Another measure of household living standards is *household consumption expenditure per capita*, an essential indicator of household demand for goods and services. Similar to the pattern observed with GDP per capita, growth in household consumption expenditure per capita has also decelerated since 2008 for Africa as a whole and for most of the country groupings. For Africa as a whole, household consumption expenditure per capita grew by 2.2 percent in 2003–2008 and by 0.7 percent in 2008–2014; it contracted by 1.4 percent in 2014–2019 (Table L1.1.2). Northern Africa, Western Africa, and UMA saw consistent increases in the growth rate from the pre-CAADP subperiod (1995–2003) to the post-CAADP subperiod (2003–2019). In level terms, similar to GDP per capita, household consumption expenditure per capita has steadily increased over time across most country

**FIGURE 16.1—GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT PER CAPITA (CONSTANT 2010 US DOLLARS), ANNUAL AVERAGE PERCENTAGE CHANGE, 2003–2019**




groupings, with the exception of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and IGAD. For example, for Africa as a whole, it grew marginally, from an annual average level of \$1,117 in the early CAADP era of 2003–2008, to \$1,223 and \$1,297 in 2008–2014 and 2014–2019, respectively.

### Food and Nutrition Security

The *prevalence of undernourishment* measures the percentage of the population whose dietary energy intake is lower than the minimum energy requirement. Although the prevalence of undernourishment was declining for many years, it has increased across many country groupings in more recent years, especially

**FIGURE 16.2—PREVALENCE OF UNDERNOURISHMENT IN AFRICA (PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION), 2000–2017**



Source: ReSAKSS based on World Bank (2020) and ILO (2020).

starting in 2015 (Figure 16.2). For Africa as a whole, the proportion of the population suffering from undernourishment declined from an average of 20.6 percent over 2003–2008 to 18.1 percent during 2008–2014, and it increased slightly, to 18.6, in 2017, the latest year for which data are available (Table L1.2.1; Figure 16.2). The proportion also increased, by more than 2.5 percent, across several other country groupings during 2014–2017, including in Central Africa, Western Africa, countries with less favorable agricultural conditions, mineral-rich countries, lower-middle-income countries, countries in the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), EAC and ECOWAS countries, countries that have been implementing CAADP longer (CC1 and CC2), countries that have not advanced in implementing CAADP (CL2), countries that are further along in CAADP implementation (CL3 and CL4), and countries that have

formulated both a first-generation NAIP1 and a second-generation NAIP2 (N11). The increasing trend in the proportion of people suffering from undernourishment threatens Africa’s ability to meet the Malabo Declaration goal of ending hunger by 2025 (FAO and UNECA 2018). The only region that continued to experience a consistent decline in the prevalence of undernourishment, albeit slow, was Northern Africa, where the prevalence fell from a low 4.9 percent in 2008–2014 to 4.2 percent in 2017 (Figure 16.2).


The prevalence of malnutrition among children younger than five years—that is, stunting (low height for age), underweight (low weight for age), and wasting (low weight for height)—has been on a declining trend over the last two decades. Stunting is the most common indicator of chronic malnutrition. For Africa as a whole and for the various country groupings, although it remains high (more than 30 percent) according to World Health Organization (2020) prevalence ranges, the prevalence of stunting

consistently declined throughout the review period. However, it is worth noting that no country grouping experienced very high prevalence rates, more than 40 percent, during the most recent period, 2014–2019. For Africa as a whole, the prevalence slowly declined from an annual average level of 39.9 percent in 1995–2003 to 34.4 percent in 2008–2014 and to 31.8 percent in 2014–2019 (Table L1.2.2B; Figure 16.3). During the latest period, 2014–2019, the highest prevalence rates, greater than 37 percent, were observed in Central Africa, in countries with less favorable agriculture conditions, in mineral-rich countries, in Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) countries, in countries that have not advanced in CAADP implementation (CL2), and in countries that have formulated only a first-generation NAIP1 (N10). The only country groupings with low prevalence of stunting—that is, less than 20 percent—are Northern Africa

and UMA member countries, at 18.0 percent and 15.8 percent in 2014–2019, respectively. Between 2003–2008 and 2014–2019, the largest reductions in child stunting, of more than 17 percent, occurred in Eastern and Northern Africa; countries with more favorable agricultural conditions; EAC, IGAD, and UMA; countries that are further along in implementing CAADP (CL4); and countries that have formulated both NAIP1 and NAIP2 (N11). Meanwhile, the smallest reduction, of less than 10 percent, occurred in Central Africa, countries with less favorable agricultural conditions, upper-middle-income countries, and countries that are not advanced in CAADP implementation (CL2).

For Africa as a whole, the *prevalence of underweight* children declined from an annual average level of 22.2 percent in 1995–2003 to 20.1 percent in 2003–2008, and further down to 16.4 percent in 2014–2019 (Table L1.2.2A; Figure 16.3). This decline represents a moderate improvement in the prevalence of underweight for Africa, moving from high prevalence in the pre-CAADP period to medium prevalence in the post-CAADP period. Despite consistent declines over time, however, the prevalence of underweight remains high, at more than 20 percent, in several country groupings, including Central and Eastern Africa, countries with less favorable agricultural conditions, mineral-rich countries, IGAD members, countries that joined CAADP early by signing a CAADP compact in 2007–2009 (CC1), countries that have not progressed much in the CAADP implementation process (CL1), and countries that have formulated only NAIP1 (N10). Between 2003–2008 and 2014–2019, relatively higher reductions in underweight prevalence, of more than 25 percent, were witnessed in Northern and Southern Africa, countries with more favorable agricultural conditions, upper-middle-income countries, EAC countries, UMA countries, and countries that are furthest along in CAADP implementation (CL4);

**FIGURE 16.3—PREVALENCE OF UNDERWEIGHT, STUNTING, AND WASTING IN AFRICA (PERCENTAGE OF CHILDREN YOUNGER THAN FIVE), 2014–2019**



Source: ReSAKSS based on World Bank (2020) and ILO (2020).

the lowest reduction in prevalence, of less than 10 percent, occurred in countries that have not advanced in CAADP implementation (CL1).

A measure of acute malnutrition, the *prevalence of wasting* in children younger than five, declined from 9.8 percent in 1995–2003 to 7.3 percent in 2014–2019 for Africa as a whole (Table L1.2.2C). The declining trend is observed across all country groupings, with Southern and Western Africa, mineral-rich countries, ECOWAS and Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries, and countries that are the furthest along in the CAADP implementation process (CL4) experiencing the largest declines in wasting, of at least 27 percent, between 2003–2008 and 2014–2019. The group of countries in COMESA, countries that have not formulated both NAIP1 and NAIP2 (N00), and countries that have not advanced in implementing CAADP (CL1) saw the lowest reductions in the prevalence of wasting over the same period. However, Northern Africa experienced




a rise in the prevalence of wasting over time, increasing from 6.0 percent in 1995–2003 to 6.2 percent in 2003–2008, and up to 7.6 percent in 2014–2019 (Table L1.2.2C). The nutritional status of children in the region has been severely impacted by ongoing conflict (UNICEF 2020).

Since 2003, about a quarter of Africa’s cereal demand has been met through imports. In particular, for Africa as whole, *cereal import dependency* increased slightly, from 25.6 percent in 2003–2008 to 26.5 percent and 27.5 percent in 2008–2014 and 2014–2016, respectively (Table L1.2.3). Cereal import dependency ratios vary widely among country groups. In 2014–2016 they averaged more than 40 percent in Northern Africa, upper-middle-income countries, UMA members, countries that have not yet embarked on the CAADP process (CC0 and CL0), and countries that have not formulated a NAIP (N00). During the same period, the cereal import dependency ratio averaged less than 15 percent in Eastern Africa, in countries with less favorable agricultural conditions, countries with more favorable agricultural conditions, and in countries that are further along the CAADP implementation process (CL3). This result indicates that in these country groupings, at least 85 percent of cereal demand is met through domestic production.

### Employment

*Employment rates*, expressed as a percentage of labor force (all individuals ages 15 to 64 years, Table L1.3.1A), have remained notably high over the review period (1995 to 2019) for Africa as a whole and for the various country groupings. The employment rate for Africa as a whole rose marginally, from 92.3 percent in 1995–2003 to 93.2 percent in 2014–2019 (Table L1.3.1A). The lowest employment rate was observed in upper-middle-income countries, averaging 79.5 percent in 2014–2019. Employment rates expressed as a percentage of the population

**FIGURE 16.4—PROPORTION AND NUMBER OF POOR PEOPLE IN AFRICA (POVERTY HEADCOUNT AT US\$1.90 PER DAY), 1995–2019**



(all individuals ages 15 and older, Table L1.3.1B) are lower and have remained constant, averaging 60.0 percent in 1995–2003 for Africa as a whole, and 58.9 percent in 2014–2019. In 2014–2019, higher employment rates, of more than 70 percent, are witnessed in Eastern Africa, countries with more favorable agricultural conditions, and EAC countries. Over the same period, Northern Africa, upper-middle-income countries, UMA members, and countries that are not engaged in the CAADP process (CC0 and CL0) recorded the lowest employment rates, less than 45 percent. In light of the seemingly high employment rates, it is important to note that about 86 percent of African workers are informally employed, which means that they have inadequate access to social security and limited, if any, rights at work, and they tend to be employed in low-productivity jobs that offer low wages (ILO 2020). Moreover, a considerable proportion of Africa’s growing youth population (20.2 percent in 2019) are not in employment,

education, or training (NEET), with much higher NEET rates among young women (ILO 2020).


### Poverty

Although Africa has consistently reduced both the incidence (headcount ratio) and the intensity (poverty gap) of poverty over the last two decades, the number of people living in poverty has increased (Figure 16.4). For Africa as a whole, the proportion of the population living on less than \$1.90 per day (measured by *poverty headcount ratio*) decreased from an annual average of 45.6 percent in 1995–2003 to 35.8 percent in 2014–2019 (Table L1.3.4). Over the same period, the number of people living on less than \$1.90 per day rose from 283 million in 1995–2003 to 331 million in 2014–2019 (Table L1.3.4; Figure 16.4).

Northern Africa and the UMA countries have the lowest poverty headcount ratios, which fell, respectively, from 3.9 percent and 4.3 percent in 2003–2008 to 1.4 percent and 0.6 percent in 2014–2019. Large declines in the poverty headcount ratio over the same period are also witnessed in countries with less favorable agricultural conditions, mineral-rich countries, upper-middle-income countries, IGAD members, countries that are not yet part of the CAADP process (CC0 and CL0), and countries that have not advanced much in CAADP implementation (CL2). Despite the declines, the proportion of people living on less than \$1.90 a day remains high, greater than 30 percent in 2014–2019 in most country groupings.

For Africa as a whole, the *poverty gap*, which is the mean shortfall of income from the poverty line, declined steadily, from 19.3 percent in 1995–2003 to 16.5 percent in 2003–2008, and further to 12.8 percent in 2014–2019 (Table L1.3.3). Most of the country groupings experienced a similar declining trend in the intensity of poverty, with the largest drops during 2014–2019 occurring in Northern Africa, mineral-rich countries, UMA countries, and countries that are yet to embark on the CAADP process (CC0 and CL0). As with the poverty headcount ratio, Northern Africa and UMA countries have the lowest annual

FIGURE 16.5—AGRICULTURE VALUE ADDED, PERCENTAGE SHARE, 2014–2019




average poverty gaps, averaging 0.2 percent and 0.1 percent in 2014–2019, respectively.

## CAADP Results Framework Level 2 Indicators: Agricultural Transformation and Sustained Inclusive Agricultural Growth

### Agricultural Production and Productivity

The AU has placed agriculture at the center of its efforts to achieve transformation through the CAADP implementation agenda. For Africa as a whole, *agricultural value added* (a measure of agricultural GDP) increased from \$183.8 billion in 1995–2003 to \$228.3 billion in 2003–2008, and to \$345.3 billion in 2014–2019 (Table L2.1.1). In 2014–2019, country groupings that contributed the largest share of Africa’s agricultural value added included Western Africa (41 percent) among geographic regions, lower-middle-income countries (65 percent) among economic categories, and countries that have formulated both NAIP1 and NAIP2 (N11) (55 percent) among NAIP country groupings (Figure 16.5). Over the same period, country groupings making up the smallest

**FIGURE 16.6—AGRICULTURAL VALUE-ADDED ANNUAL AVERAGE GROWTH (PERCENTAGE), 2008–2019**




shares of Africa’s agricultural value added included Central Africa (6 percent), countries with less favorable agricultural conditions (5 percent), mineral-rich countries (3 percent), and those that have designed only a first-generation NAIP1 (N10) (15 percent).

In terms of growth, agricultural value added for Africa as a whole remained at less than the 6 percent CAADP target throughout the review period (1995 to 2019). Specifically, it grew at an annual average rate of 4.6 percent in 1995–2003 and fell to 3.2 percent growth in 2014–2019 (Table L2.1.1). Although a handful of country groupings achieved growth rates of at least 6 percent

during the pre-CAADP era (1995–2003), only the group of countries that have not advanced in CAADP implementation (CL2) met the 6 percent target more recently, in 2014–2019, and EAC countries came close, at 5.8 percent. In addition, a total of 10 countries either met or surpassed the 6 percent target in 2014–2019, with Gabon, Guinea, and Kenya achieving growth rates of more than 10 percent (Figure 16.6).

The *agricultural production index* (API) shows total agricultural production for each year relative to the base period of 2004–2006. For Africa as a whole and all of the country groupings, API exhibited an increasing trend. For Africa as a

**FIGURE 16.7—LABOR AND LAND PRODUCTIVITY IN AFRICA, ANNUAL AVERAGE GROWTH (PERCENTAGE)**



during 2008–2014 when compared with the other periods. For the most recent period, 2014–2019, the annual average growth in labor productivity was highest (at least 4 percent) in Northern Africa, UMA countries, and non-CAADP countries (CC0 and CL0). These three country groupings also had the highest labor productivity levels, of more than \$5,900 per agricultural worker, in 2014–2019, partially due to their higher levels of mechanization. Over the same period, decreases in labor productivity growth were recorded in Southern Africa, ECCAS and SADC members, the group of countries that signed a CAADP compact in 2013–2015 (CC3), those that are not advanced in CAADP implementation (CL1), and countries that have formulated only a first-generation NAIP (N10). The lowest labor productivity, of less than \$700 per agricultural worker, was in Central Africa, countries with more favorable agricultural conditions, mineral-rich countries, and countries that are not advanced in CAADP implementation (CL2).

For Africa as whole, *land productivity*, measured by agricultural value added per hectare of arable land, grew more rapidly in 2014–2019 than in earlier sub-

whole, API grew by 2.8 percent in 1995–2003 and by 3.6 percent in 2008–2014 (Table L2.1.2). In several country groupings, growth in API was highest in 2008–2014, increasing by more than 5 percent in Eastern Africa, countries with more favorable agricultural conditions, countries that have not advanced in CAADP implementation (CL1), and countries that have formulated only a first-generation NAIP (N10).

Labor and land productivity are essential for driving Africa’s agricultural growth and transformation. For Africa as a whole, both labor and land productivity have consistently increased since 2008 compared with the earlier period of 2003–2008 (Figure 16.7). *Agricultural labor productivity*, measured by agricultural value added per agricultural worker, increased by 2.1 percent in 2008–2014 and by 1.4 percent in 2014–2019 (Table L2.1.3; Figure 16.7). Similarly, for most of the country groupings, the rate of growth in labor productivity was highest

periods from 1995 to 2014 (Figure 16.7). Specifically, Africa’s land productivity grew at 4.9 percent in 2014–2019, compared with 1.6 percent in 2003–2008 and 3.2 percent in 1995–2003 (Table L2.1.4). Country groupings with the highest annual average growth in land productivity, of more than 6 percent, during the most recent period, 2014–2019, are Eastern Africa; lower-middle-income countries; CEN-SAD, COMESA, and IGAD member countries; countries that signed a CAADP compact later (CC3); those that are not advanced in CAADP implementation (CL1); and those that have formulated only a first-generation NAIP (N10). The highest annual average levels of land productivity in 2014–2019, more than \$600 per hectare of arable land, are witnessed in IGAD countries, countries that joined CAADP early (CC1), and countries that are further along in the CAADP implementation process (CL4) (Table L2.1.4). Over the same subperiod, the lowest annual average level of land productivity (of less than \$100

per hectare of arable land) is observed in Southern Africa, a region that also experienced negative growth in land productivity.


### *Intra-African Agricultural Trade*

Tripling intra-African agricultural trade between 2015 and 2025, a key Malabo Declaration commitment, is critical for driving economic growth, generating jobs, and improving food and nutrition security, as well as advancing the objectives of the African Continental Free Trade Area agreement. Africa has witnessed remarkable annual average growth in intra-African agricultural exports and imports alike during the post-CAADP period (2003 to 2018) (Tables L2.2.1A and L2.2.1B). For Africa as a whole, *intra-African agricultural exports* nearly tripled between 1995–2003 and 2014–2018, rising from an annual average of \$5.2 billion to \$15.3 billion (Table L2.2.1A).

Africa as a whole and several country groupings experienced stronger annual average growth in intra-African agricultural exports in 2008–2014 than in the most recent subperiod, 2014–2018. For example, intra-African agricultural exports, for Africa as a whole, grew at annual average rates of 9.2 percent and 3.0 percent in 2008–2014 and 2014–2018, respectively. However, a few country groupings were exceptions—Eastern Africa, IGAD members, countries that joined CAADP later (CC3), and countries that are not advanced in CAADP implementation (CL1)—with stronger annual average growth, of 14.5 percent or more, in 2014–2018.

Southern Africa has consistently made up about half of all intra-African agricultural exports, averaging 52 percent in 2014–2018, whereas Central Africa accounted for the smallest share, about 1 percent, over the same period (Figure 16.8). In terms of economic categories, lower-middle-income and

**FIGURE 16.8—INTRA-AFRICAN AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS, PERCENTAGE SHARE**



upper-middle-income countries make up the largest shares of intra-African agricultural exports, with about 40 percent each. Countries with less favorable agricultural conditions and mineral-rich countries contribute the smallest shares of intra-African agricultural exports. In addition, for the NAIP country groupings, countries that have not engaged in NAIP formulation (N00) made up the biggest share of intra-African agricultural exports, whereas those that have formulated only NAIP1 (N10) had the smallest share (Figure 16.8).

*Intra-African agricultural imports* for Africa as a whole more than doubled between 1995–2003 and 2014–2018, increasing from \$6 billion to \$14.2 billion (Table L2.2.1B).<sup>8</sup> Similar to exports, intra-African agricultural imports also witnessed stronger annual average growth in Africa as a whole and several country groups in 2008–2014, compared with the most recent subperiod, 2014–2018. For example, Africa’s intra-African agricultural imports grew

<sup>8</sup> The value of intra-African agricultural exports and imports for Africa as a whole is expected to be equal. However, Tables TL2.2.1A and TL2.2.1B show exports to be greater than imports, likely due to (1) differences in the ways in which the origins of initial exports versus re-exports are reflected in the imports; (2) differences in the valuation of exports versus imports in terms of using cost, insurance, and freight or free on board values; and (3) conversion of values measured in current US dollars to constant 2010 US dollars.




at annual average rates of 5.1 percent and 1.8 percent in 2008–2014 and 2014–2018, respectively. Nonetheless, a few country groupings—Eastern Africa and IGAD countries—experienced much stronger growth in 2014–2018, of more than 10 percent, compared with 2008–2014. In addition, despite strong growth in intra-African agricultural exports in the first two post-CAADP subperiods (2003–2008 and 2008–2014), several country groupings recorded negative growth in the most recent subperiod, 2014–2018, including Central Africa, ECCAS members, and mineral-rich countries (Table L2.2.1B).

Shares of intra-African agricultural imports by different groupings, including regional, economic, and NAIP categories, are similar to those observed for exports (Figure 16.9). For example, Southern Africa, lower- and upper-middle-income countries, and countries that have not yet formulated a NAIP (N00) account for the largest shares of intra-African agricultural imports in their respective groupings. Similarly, the smallest contributors to intra-African agricultural imports include Central Africa, countries with less favorable agricultural conditions, and mineral-rich countries.

### *Resilience of Livelihoods and Management of Risks*

The existence of food reserves, food insecurity response programs, and early warning systems is a key indicator for assessing the resilience of livelihoods and production systems to climate variability as well as for managing risks associated with the agriculture sector. As of September 2020, 42 countries had food reserves, conducted local purchases of food for relief programs, had early warning systems, and were implementing school feeding programs (Table L3(b)).

**FIGURE 16.9—INTRA-AFRICAN AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS, PERCENTAGE SHARE**




## CAADP Results Framework Level 3 Indicators: Strengthening Systemic Capacity to Deliver Results

### *Capacities for Policy Design and Implementation*

Progress in the implementation of actions aimed at strengthening systemic capacity for agriculture and food-security policy planning and implementation is presented in Table L3(b). As of September 2020, 20 countries had formulated new or revised second-generation NAIPs through inclusive and participatory processes; 28 had inclusive institutionalized mechanisms for mutual accountability and peer review (mainly JSRs); 36 were implementing evidence-based policies; 31 had functional multisectoral and multistakeholder coordination bodies—mainly agriculture sector working groups; and 21 had successfully undertaken agriculture-related public-private partnerships aimed at boosting specific agricultural value chains. Furthermore, Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System (SAKSS) platforms, which help countries meet their specific data, analytical, and capacity needs, were established in 14 countries.

**FIGURE 16.10—GOVERNMENT AGRICULTURE EXPENDITURE, PERCENTAGE SHARE**



Africa contributed the least (4 percent) (Figure 16.10). Within economic categories, lower-middle-income countries, followed by upper-middle-income countries, made up the highest shares of GAE in 2014–2019, of 45 percent and 32 percent, respectively, and mineral-rich countries made up the lowest share, of about 1 percent. Countries that have yet to formulate either a first-generation NAIP1 or a second-generation NAIP2 (N00) contributed the lion's share of GAE, more than 50 percent, in 2014–2019, and the smallest contribution, of about 12 percent, came from countries that have formulated only a first-generation NAIP1 (N10).

For Africa as a whole and most of the country groupings, the *share of agriculture expenditure in total government expenditure* has consistently remained less than the CAADP

### Government Agriculture Expenditure

For Africa as a whole, *government agriculture expenditure* (GAE) increased in real terms throughout the review period, more than doubling between 1995–2003 and 2014–2019. Specifically, Africa allocated an annual average of \$9.6 billion to agriculture in 1995–2003, which rose to \$13.1 billion in 2003–2008, and further to \$19.6 billion in 2014–2019 (Table L3.5.1). However, in more recent years, the growth in Africa's GAE has declined, increasing at annual average rate of 3.0 percent in 2014–2019, compared with 6.3 percent in 2003–2008 and 4.4 percent in 1995–2003. A similar growth trend in GAE is observed in the majority of the other country groupings, but a number of country groupings experienced negative growth in GAE in 2014–2019—Southern Africa, ECCAS and SADC countries, countries that joined CAADP late (CC3), countries have formulated only NAIP1 (N10), and the groups of countries that either are not advanced (CL1 and CL2) or are advanced (CL3) in CAADP implementation (Table L3.5.1).

In terms of geographic region, Northern Africa contributed the largest proportion of GAE (45 percent) in 2014–2019, whereas Central

target of 10 percent of national budgets allocated to agriculture. For example, for Africa as whole, the share has remained fairly constant, declining slightly from 3.6 percent in 2003–2008 to 3.2 percent in 2008–2014 before rising marginally to 3.3 percent in 2014–2019 (Table L3.5.2). Only a handful of country groupings achieved agriculture expenditure shares of at least 7 percent in 2014–2019—countries with less or more favorable agricultural conditions, and those that are advanced in implementing CAADP (CL3). In addition, during the same period, Southern Africa, countries that joined CAADP later (CC3), and those that are not advanced in implementing CAADP (CL1) allocated the smallest shares of their budgets to agriculture, less than 2 percent. Notably, country groupings that are fairly advanced in CAADP implementation (such as CL3 countries) have allocated a larger proportion of their national budgets to agriculture, unlike those that joined the process later and have not progressed much in implementing the program (CC3 and CL1). Although no country grouping met the 10 percent budget target, a total of seven individual countries met or surpassed the target in 2014–2019—Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Senegal, and Sierra Leone (Figure 16.11). Two countries came close to meeting the target—Benin


(9.4 percent) and Nigeria (9.5 percent).

The share of GAE in agricultural GDP provides insights into how Africa is spending on agriculture relative to the size of its agricultural sector. For Africa as a whole, the *share of GAE in agricultural GDP* decreased marginally, from 5.9 percent in 2003–2008 to 5.7 percent in 2014–2019 (Table L3.5.3). Northern and Southern Africa, upper-middle-income countries, UMA members, and countries that have yet to embark on the CAADP process (CC0 and CL0) or have not yet formulated a NAIP1 (N00) consistently recorded the highest shares, of more than 10 percent, throughout the review period (1995–2019), reflecting the larger agriculture expenditures in these countries relative to the size of their agricultural sector.

### Policy Responses to COVID-19 in Selected Countries

To address the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on agrifood systems, African countries have used a combination of fiscal, trade, social, and market policies. As expected, social protection initiatives are a significant part of COVID-19 response packages in most countries. Here we outline policy responses of selected

**FIGURE 16.11—SHARE OF GOVERNMENT AGRICULTURE EXPENDITURE IN TOTAL PUBLIC EXPENDITURE (PERCENTAGE), 2008–2014 AND 2014–2019**



Source: ReSAKSS based on IFPRI (2020), World Bank (2020), and national sources.

countries from when the pandemic broke out, in February 2020, up to the end of August 2020.

**Nigeria:** In April, the Nigerian federal government reduced the price of fertilizer from 5,500 Nigerian naira (N) to N 5,000 per 50-kilogram bag while offering farmers price subsidies for seeds to ensure the continuity of agricultural activities during the lockdown period (*Nigerian Tribune* 2020). Moreover, the government managed to secure €995 million worth of agricultural equipment, including tractors, to lease out to farmers (Chiejina 2020). It approved N 13 billion to control transboundary pests and minimize the impacts of COVID-19. The Central Bank of Nigeria is set to disburse no-interest loans to farmers through the Anchor Borrowers’ Programme and Targeted Credit Facility to

support households and small and medium enterprises affected by COVID-19. It also announced support for local maize farmers, who are expected to produce 12.5 million tons of maize over the 18 months starting in May 2020. The federal government has delivered 5,318 metric tons of assorted foodstuffs to the government of Kano state for distribution to the less privileged, the vulnerable, and people living with disabilities as palliatives against the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic (Abdullateef 2020).

**Egypt:** At the start of the wheat harvest season in April 2020, the government fixed the price at 700 Egyptian pounds per ardeb (150 kilograms) to support farmers and boost wheat reserves in the country over seven months (El Wardany 2020). The minister of agriculture, with the approval of the governor of the Central Bank of Egypt, has postponed debt payments by farmers for six months, until October 1, 2020. The government extended a moratorium on agricultural land taxes for a period of two years. At the same time, Egypt banned the export of pulses for three months, except for peanuts, green peas, and green beans (*Egypt Today* 2020). In April 2020, the country also changed its import tender policies by requiring suppliers to replace any wheat shipments impacted by COVID-19 transport restrictions with wheat from elsewhere and to bear the cost of doing so. The Ministry of Social Solidarity added 100,000 families to the country's monetary subsidy program as Egypt expanded its social safety net program amid COVID-19. The families will receive a monthly social allowance (Bhatia 2020).

**Ethiopia:** Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, in April, the government of Ethiopia distributed agricultural inputs such as fertilizer, insecticide, and equipment to farmers across the country (Ethiopian News Agency 2020). The government requested international companies to supply the country with 18.1 million quintals of wheat, 1.73 million quintals of rice, 3.2 million quintals of sugar, and 104.3 million liters of edible oil, free of tax, in order to reduce any food shortages due to the pandemic. Only selected companies are expected to import wheat, but they will subcontract with local distributors to distribute the wheat to consumer cooperatives. The Ethiopian prime minister launched the "Each One Feed One" National Challenge, a nationwide effort to mobilize Ethiopians to provide a meal to the most vulnerable. The Ministry of Revenues and the Customs Commission jointly donated food and clothing worth over 1.4 billion Ethiopian birr to nine regional states, two city administrations, and 26 charities to address the impacts of COVID-19. The government also declared a state of emergency, which forbids landlords from increasing housing rents

and evicting tenants unless the tenants want to leave. The Federal Housing Corporation announced a 50 percent rent reduction starting in April. The state of emergency law also forbids companies from laying off workers and terminating employment during the period of emergency. The Commercial Bank of Ethiopia announced a three-month suspension of mortgage payments for condominium homes. It also announced a suspension of debt collection activity during the same period. On April 17, the Steering Committee for Ethiopia's federal Urban Development Safety Net Program announced that (1) beneficiaries of the Urban Productive Safety Net Program would receive three monthly safety net payments in advance and (2) Ethiopians residing in 16 cities identified to be at high risk of COVID-19 exposure and who need assistance would also receive three months of safety net payments in advance. In May 2020, the Addis Ababa city administration launched a food rationing program, funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, to distribute food to more than 1,000 vulnerable people in the Lideta and Addis Ketema sub cities over a period of three months (Fana Broadcasting 2020). The city has also prepared more than 421 hectares of land for urban agriculture to mitigate the impact of COVID-19 on food shortages.

**Ghana:** Under the country's Coronavirus Alleviation Program, the president of Ghana announced that the government would allocate (1) 280 million Ghanaian cedis (GH¢) for food security among the most vulnerable and to pay the water bills of all Ghanaians from April to June; (2) GH¢323 million to support the healthcare sector; and (3) GH¢600 million for micro, small, and medium-scale businesses (CNBC Africa 2020). All water tankers, publicly and privately owned, have been mobilized to ensure a supply of water to all vulnerable communities. Beginning April 1, the government suspended rent charges for cargo during a partial three-week lockdown (Larnyoh 2020). Since March, the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection, the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, and the National Disaster Management Organization, working with faith-based organizations, have provided food for up to 400,000 individuals and households in the areas affected by COVID-19-related restrictions. The Ghanaian government agreed to fully absorb the electricity bills of the poorest of the poor from April to June to provide free electricity for persons who consume up to 50 kilowatt hours a month. For all other residential consumers, the government agreed to cover 50 percent of their electricity bills for the period April to June.

**Rwanda:** On March 17, 2020, the Rwandan government set fixed prices for staple foods, and distributed food, under the supervision of local leaders, to the urban poor who cannot work and have no gardens (Rwanda, Ministry of Trade and Industry 2020). Also in March, the National Bank of Rwanda offered to buy back bonds at the prevailing market rate and reduce the waiting period for individuals who fail to sell their bonds on the secondary market from 30 to 15 days. Since the beginning of the pandemic, the Rwanda Red Cross has supplied food items, face masks, and handwashing facilities to 13,000 families whose livelihoods were disrupted by the lockdown (African Business 2020).

The above discussion shows that countries have stepped up and enacted measures to mitigate the effects of COVID-19 on their respective agrifood systems. Although commendable, given the systemic nature of COVID-19, these individual country efforts are not enough to fully address the fallout from the pandemic. Coordination is needed to avoid conflicting initiatives with negative spillover effects. For example, some countries have imposed export bans on some products, which are likely to hurt their trading partners.

Therefore, countries need to sustain their COVID-19 responses aimed at improving food security by collectively implementing the short- and medium-term measures adopted by AU ministers of agriculture, trade, and finance on July 27, 2020, to ensure food and nutrition security in the midst of COVID-19. The measures include (1) recognizing food and agricultural input markets and supply chains as essential services and ensuring they remain open; (2) providing small-holder farmers with access to quality agricultural inputs and equipment to boost agricultural productivity; (3) ensuring the private sector has access to affordable finance to support local businesses and quality jobs; (4) applying digital technologies to support agrifood systems and services; (5) reducing customs duties on food products to promote food security; (6) ensuring that borders remain open to facilitate regional trade in food and agricultural inputs; and (7) adjusting existing social safety net programs to address vulnerabilities due to COVID-19 (AU 2020).

## *Conclusions and Implications*

This chapter shows that Africa continues to steadily advance the CAADP implementation agenda. The launch of the second BR report and AATS at the AU summit in February 2020 marked an important milestone in promoting mutual accountability on the continent. The trends in CAADP indicators presented in this chapter show both progress being made and areas requiring urgent attention.

Owing to the recent global economic slowdown and lower commodity prices, Africa's GDP per capita growth has continued to slow, reaching an annual average rate of 0.2 percent in 2014–2019. And in light of the COVID-19 pandemic and its damaging effects, Africa's economic growth will likely contract further in 2020. Although Africa's prevalence of undernourishment was declining for many years, more recently it rose from 18.1 percent in 2008–2014 to 18.6 percent in 2017. The increase was even higher in the Central and Western Africa regions. Moreover, despite declines over time in the prevalence rates for stunting, underweight, and wasting in children under five years old, they remain rather high for Africa and for many country groupings. Africa's prevalence of stunting is considered high by WHO guidelines, at 31.8 percent in 2014–2019. Meanwhile, although Africa has consistently managed to reduce both the incidence and the intensity of poverty over time, the number of people living in poverty has been on the rise. In particular, whereas the *proportion* of Africa's population living on less than \$1.90 per day fell from 45.6 percent in 1995–2003 to 35.8 percent in 2014–2019, the *number* of people living on less than \$1.90 per day rose from 283 million to 331 million over the same period. The chapter also shows that only a handful of countries have met or surpassed the CAADP targets of achieving 6 percent agricultural growth and allocating 10 percent of the national budget to agriculture.

These trends highlight the need for countries to consolidate the progress made while urgently tackling high levels of child malnutrition, rising undernourishment, and growing numbers of poor people. This will require policy actions to increase both agricultural investments and productivity, and to improve market access and trade infrastructure. Although the policy measures adopted to combat COVID-19 in the selected African countries reviewed in the chapter are commendable, coordination is needed across countries to avoid conflicting initiatives and negative spillovers. Thus, African governments need to collectively institute policies that keep borders open and promote cross-border trade in food and agricultural inputs. Investments to improve health and food security outcomes and support social protection and resilience-building initiatives for the most vulnerable groups are of the essence. Moreover, African leaders need to hasten their efforts to formulate and implement policies and evidence-based NAIPs that put countries on a trajectory to achieve the Malabo commitments by 2025.