

# ReSAKSS

Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System  
Facilitated by IFPRI 

## GHANA

RESAKSS CNA REPORT 5

Capacity  
Strengthening  
Strategy through  
Capacity Needs  
Assessment for  
Country Level  
Strategic Analysis  
and Knowledge  
Support System  
(SAKSS)



# GHANA

## Capacity Strengthening Strategy through Capacity Needs Assessment for Country Level Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System (SAKSS)

*Facilitated by IFPRI and coordinated by ReSAKSS. Prepared by national teams under the leadership of the Planning, Policy, Monitoring and Evaluation Department (PPMED), Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA) Ghana with participation of national experts including Professor Saa Dittoh as a lead consultant.*

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 2009, Ghana made a commitment to pursue economic growth through agricultural development by signing a Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP) Compact and launching a Medium Term Agriculture Sector Investment Plan (METASIP). Under CAADP guidelines, Ghana and numerous other African nations pledge to achieve 6 percent growth in their agricultural sector and allocate at least 10 percent of their national budget to agriculture. Achieving these goals at the country level not only requires various programs and interventions but also the continuous generation of evidence to inform, design, implement, and modify them.

In Ghana and elsewhere on the continent, the capacities and skills for policy analysis, dialogue, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) are inadequate in scope, quality, and volume. Even data collection and processing are oftentimes deficient. To address this and support the CAADP process, the Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System (ReSAKSS)—an Africa-wide network that provides high-quality data, analysis, and tools to decision-makers, practitioners, and other agriculture stakeholders—has been adapted to suit country-level needs. These new platforms called SAKSS have been established across the continent to address and analyze emerging issues, opportunities, and challenges facing each country's agriculture sector. SAKSS develop systems of information generation, M&E, and knowledge management.

The objective of this Capacity Needs Assessment (CNA) study is to identify where and how to improve Ghana's agricultural policy analysis, investment planning, implementation, M&E, and knowledge management. To achieve this objective, researchers first needed to identify and understand country-level capacities, skills, and analytical tools that already exist and function effectively in addition to ones that are deficient or nonexistent.

The CNA was conducted at three levels: the policy process/enabling environment level, organizational level, and individual level. The assessment focused on the thematic issues related to (1) strategic policy analysis, (2) M&E, and (3) knowledge management and sharing. Thirteen organizations were covered in this assessment, including government ministries, research organizations, universities, and professional associations.

Representatives of sixteen key agricultural policy institutions and organizations were interviewed using well-designed questionnaires. The institutions and organizations were classified as (a) policy research and analysis institutions, (b) policy process institutions and organizations, or (c) international organizations and development partners. Information collected included institutional capacity and policy processes, organizational capacity needs, and individual capacity and skills needs. Stakeholder responses were analyzed and a draft report was produced, which was then evaluated at a validation workshop involving the minister of food and agriculture and other high-ranking officials. The draft was subsequently revised to incorporate feedback from workshop participants and reviewed by an external peer review committee.

## KEY FINDINGS

### Institutional Capacity and Policy Processes

- Establishing the METASIP Steering Committee with members from major subsectors of the agriculture sector as well as six thematic groups has helped to establish some level of cooperation and collaboration for the effective implementation of the investment plan.

- The general view of stakeholders interviewed is that the sector’s political leadership has not been responsive or inspiring enough and, for that reason, policies and programs are not being implemented as efficiently as they could be.
- Funding for agriculture sector M&E activities—including data generation, analysis, and dissemination activities— is very limited.
- Supply of evidence-based research is partially determined by demand, and the study suggests that there is relatively low demand. It is worth noting that this particular finding was strongly contested by some stakeholders at the validation workshop; nonetheless, there is considerable evidence for the claim.
- There are few organized mechanisms for managing or sharing knowledge within Ghana’s agriculture sector. Similarly, there is very limited visibility of the sector’s activities.
- There is a growing tendency for some development partners (DPs) to undertake agricultural and rural development programs in ways that run parallel to the government’s efforts within the same subsectors. This conflicts with the comprehensive and coherent nature of the CAADP process and potentially impedes the government’s efforts in the agriculture sector.

### Organizational Capacity

- Though limited, the Ghana SAKSS Secretariat and its six thematic groups do have existing capacities for policy research and analysis, knowledge management, capacity building, and M&E.
- The SAKSS Secretariat does not presently have adequate human, material, and financial resources to support the METASIP Steering Committee with the evidence-based research it needs to make informed decisions.

### Individual Capacity

- There is virtually no capacity for M&E at the district level. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the private sector (including foreign organizations), and even some development partners do not provide information on their agriculture-related activities for the purpose of M&E, and there is no mechanism to make them do so.
- There is a high level of staff attrition due mainly to poor service conditions, lack of incentive and motivation, and limited opportunities to improve their work skills and capacities.

### Lessons Learned and Recommendations

1. There is a need for a strong SAKSS Secretariat that is relatively independent from the government in terms of personnel, finances, and hierarchy.
2. Agricultural policy discussions and dialogue are equally as important at the regional, national, and district levels, and capacity building of relevant staff needs to occur at all levels for the effective implementation of the METSAIP.
3. A strong public relations unit is required to disseminate relevant information to stakeholders and establish regional and district platforms for regular interaction between them and government functionaries, including the METASIP Steering Committee.

4. Inadequate funding is the main reason that M&E information is available only in limited ways.
5. While effective internal management and evaluation has led to innovative ideas for how to change or modify policies and undertake strategic planning, the lack of organized collaboration between staff members to critically reflect on the sector's overall performance stifles progress.
6. Some actions taken by development partners—including direct district-level activities implemented without significant collaboration with relevant ministries—undermine the whole development process.
7. Organized knowledge management and sharing mechanisms are needed at all levels—district, national, and regional—to ensure adequate communication of knowledge and relevant feedback.

## **Recommendations for SAKSS and the METASIP Steering Committee**

1. The SAKSS Secretariat should be located at the Programme Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Department (PPMED) of MOFA but with considerable independence and diverse sources of direct funding to enable it to function as a policy analysis and knowledge system secretariat. It should be coordinated by a person with a research background.
2. The SAKSS Secretariat should be a center that links the activities of the METASIP Steering Committee to those of the thematic groups.
3. A comprehensive plan should be devised to bridge the human capacity gap in the short, medium, and long term.
4. Agricultural policy issues and analysis concepts should be part of the curricula of agricultural faculties at universities.
8. A sustainable funding mechanism has to be put in place to ensure success of the SAKSS initiative.
9. There is a great need for improved governance in the agriculture sector that encourages innovation, new and different points of view from staff members, and taking a critical eye to its own approaches.
10. There should be specific capacity-building activities related to policy discussions, good governance, data generation, and analysis for agriculture sector staff at all levels as well as for personnel of NGOs, faith-based organizations (FBOs), and others.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAGDS	Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Development Strategy
ACDEP	Association of Church Development Projects
ADB	Agricultural Development Bank
AEAs	Agricultural Extension Agents
AfDB	African Development Bank
AGRA	Alliance for Green Revolution in Africa
AgSSIP	Agriculture Services Sector Investment Programme
ARI	Animal Research Institute
ASAC	agricultural sector adjustment credit
ASIP	Agricultural Sub-Sector Investment Project
ASWG	Agriculture Sector Working Group
AU	African Union
CAADP	Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme
CEPA	Centre for Economic Policy Analysis
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CNA	capacity needs assessment
CRI	Crops Research Institute
CSIR	Council for Scientific and Industrial Research
CSOs	civil society organizations
DAs	district assemblies



DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DPs	development partners
ECOWAP	ECOWAS Agricultural Programme
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
FASDEP	Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization (of the United Nations)
FINSAP	financial sector investment program
FRI	Food Research Institute
GAWU	General Agricultural Workers Union
GCAP	Ghana Commercial Agriculture Programme (of MOFA)
GFAP	Ghana Federation of Agricultural Producers
GIDA	Ghana Irrigation Development Authority
GIZ	German Development Cooperation
GPRS I	Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy
GPRS II	Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy
GSB	Ghana Standards Board (now Ghana Standards Authority)
GSDA	Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda
GSS	Ghana Statistical Services
HQ	headquarters
IAR	Institute for Agricultural Research (of UG)
IDRC	International Development Research Centre (of Canada)
IEA	Institute of Economic Affairs
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
IITA	International Institute of Tropical Agriculture
ISSER	Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (of UG)
IWMI	International Water Management Institute
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
KNUST	Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, Kumasi
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
MDAs	Ministries, Departments and Agencies
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
METASIP	medium-term agriculture sector investment plan

MLF	Ministry of Lands and Forestry
MLGRD	Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development
MOFA	Ministry of Food and Agriculture
MOFEP	Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
MOTI	Ministry of Trade and Industry
MTADP	medium-term agricultural development program
NAEP	National Agricultural Extension Project
NARP	National Agricultural Research Project
NARS	National Agricultural Research System
NDPC	National Development Planning Commission
NLSP	National Livestock Services Programme
NEPAD	New Economic Partnership for Development
NGOs	nongovernmental organizations
PEF	Private Enterprises Foundation
PFAG	Peasant Farmers' Association of Ghana
PPMED	Programme Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Department (of MOFA)
RCCs	regional coordinating councils
ReSAKSS	Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System
SADA	Savanna Accelerated Development Authority
SAKSS	Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SARI	Savanna Agricultural Research Institute
SAS	statistical analysis software
SC	steering committee
SGER	State of Ghana Economy Report
SPSS	Special Package for Social Sciences (Computer software)
SRID	Statistics, Research and Information Department
STEPRI	Science and Technology Policy Research Institute (of CSIR)
SWAp	sector-wide approach
SWOT	strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats
UDS	University for Development Studies, Tamale
UG	University of Ghana, Legon
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WA	West Africa

# 1. INTRODUCTION

## 1.1. Brief Historical Review of Ghana's Agricultural Policies

While it is difficult to discuss agricultural policy in isolation when so many other national policies have some bearing on agriculture, this section gives a brief overview of key policies that have shaped Ghana's agriculture sector over time.

Although the Ghana Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy (FASDEP II) has been the country's core agricultural framework since 2009 (MOFA 2007), there have been other agriculture-focused policies since independence and even before. Some of those include the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) spearheaded by the World Bank in the 1980s and 1990s, which was actually a combination of several policies covering different aspects of the economy; the Financial Sector Investment Programme (FINSAP) of the early 1990s, which was actually a component of the SAP; and the Vision 2020 Framework, which oversaw the Medium Term Agricultural Development Programme (MTADP) (1991–2000). The following agricultural projects were implemented under the MTADP: the National Agricultural Research Project (1991–99), National Agricultural Extension Project (1992–2000), Agricultural Sector Adjustment Credit (1992–99), National Livestock Services Project (1993–99), Agricultural Sub-Sector Investment Project (1994–2000), and others. After the MTADP, came the Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Development Strategy (1996–2000), under which the Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy (FASDEP I) was developed. This policy was in place during the implementation of the Agriculture Services Sector Investment Programme (2002–06) but was revised in 2006 and 2007 into FASDEP II (2009–15). Other policies that have been largely agricultural or have had great bearing on the agriculture sector include Ghana Irrigation Policy, Ghana Land Policy, and Ghana Trade and Industry Policy.

FASDEP II was prepared through an extensive consultative process with inter-ministerial teams focused on different areas of interventions. Several development partners, including the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the World Bank, strongly supported the development of FASDEP II. Its objectives are in consonance with the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (2003–05), the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (2006–09), and the current Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (2010–13)—all of which were developed by the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC). These strategies are also linked to the Economic Community of West African States' Agriculture Programme (ECOWAP), the African Union's New Economic Partnership for Development (NEPAD), CAADP, and the global Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

The Medium Term Agriculture Sector Investment Plan (METASIP) is the implementation plan of FASDEP II (MOFA 2010b). Its development followed a sector-wide approach and received support from CAADP and several development partners. Critical to the implementation of the METASIP is the recognition of linkages between

1. MOFA and other ministries, departments, and agencies involved in agriculture-related activities;
2. The private sector, including farmers, processors, and input suppliers; and
3. Development partners in the Agriculture Sector Working Group (ASWG) and beyond.

The METASIP has seen wide acceptance among politicians and policymakers in the country, as evidenced by the absence of program revisions despite a shift in ruling political parties. The document has also been endorsed by all major stakeholders in the agriculture sector—namely agricultural workers, farmers, the private sector, relevant governmental agencies and nongovernmental organizations, civil society organizations, and development partners.

As with any plan, the METASIP will have its imperfections, but it should still be able to create positive impact in the agriculture sector if implemented properly.

## 1.2 Purpose and Objectives of the Study

By signing a CAADP Compact in October 2009, Ghana made a commitment to the CAADP process, which guides the agricultural and rural development policies of individual African countries in alignment with the policy guidelines of regional economic commissions, such as the Economic Community of West African States' Agriculture Programme (ECOWAP).

The achievement of CAADP goals at the country level critically depends on continuous generation of evidence for the design, implementation, and modification of various agricultural programs and interventions. Concrete data are not usually included in policy documents, however, leading to serious challenges with implementation even when policies are formulated. Inadequate capacities and insufficient skills to analyze, discuss, and even collect data contribute to this problem and lead to similar challenges at the policy implementation and M&E stage as well. To tackle these problems, researchers must first assess what is available and what is required. Again, information on the status of current capacities and analytical tools—in terms of both quantity and quality—is lacking.

Country-level Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support Systems (SAKSS) were established to help find solutions for these shortcomings in African agriculture. The SAKSS are expected to see to the continuous analysis of emerging issues, constraints, and challenges facing the agricultural sector and develop a system of information generation, M&E, and knowledge management. They will work in close collaboration with the regional-level knowledge platforms (ReSAKSS) to improve the quality of policy and strategic planning and implementation in order to accelerate growth and progress toward poverty reduction and food and nutrition security. Capacities need to be built in Ghana and other countries to generate credible, timely, and high-quality knowledge products to inform and guide agricultural sector policies as well as planning and review processes.

The capacity needs assessment study conducted for the Ghana SAKSS was undertaken to identify and strengthen capacities to generate evidence-based information, M&E, and knowledge sharing in the agriculture sector. In particular, the study addresses the following questions:

1. What are the country-specific needs for strategic agricultural policy analysis, investment planning, implementation, M&E, and knowledge management?
2. What individual capacities are needed in the short, medium, and long term to satisfy those needs?
3. How can organizations harness these capacities for effective use in the CAADP process?
4. What institutional and capacity constraints exist in the policy process that may be preventing policy organizations from helping to effectively meet CAADP objectives?
5. How can such capacity gaps be identified and filled?

The study thus aimed to:

1. Assess existing human capacity and gaps in Ghana's relevant organizations;
2. Evaluate the organizational capacity of both state and non-state organizations and potential areas for improvement;

3. Identify any institutional and capacity constraints in the policy process, with a particular focus on the effective use of evidence; and
4. Produce a capacity strengthening strategy for the Ghana SAKSS based on these assessments.

## 2. METHODOLOGY OF THE CAPACITY NEEDS ASSESSMENT

An inception workshop for the Ghana capacity needs assessment (CNA) study was held on October 9, 2012, at the Ministry of Food and Agriculture Conference Room in Accra, and many key stakeholders attended. Several members of the Ghana METASIP Steering Committee as well as some members of the six SAKSS thematic groups (which correspond to the six METASIP program areas) attended. Mr. Manson Nwafor of the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture's ReSAKSS West Africa outlined the methodology of the CNA (Appendix 1).

The presentation was followed by a discussion on the methodology and likely practical constraints. Concerns were raised with regards to the length of the capacity-needs questionnaires, especially for research organizations, and with the tight deadlines, especially given that they coincided with Ghana's ongoing campaigns, elections, and holidays. Nevertheless, it was agreed that the study was urgently needed and must go on.

A mapping of the key agricultural policy institutions and organizations listed below was created to facilitate efficient execution of the assessment.

1. MOFA departments, specialized agencies, projects, and programs
2. Ministries of Finance and Economic Planning; Education; Trade and Industry; Lands and Forestry; Health; Women and Children's Affairs; Roads and Transport; and others
3. Local government and rural development agencies, including district, municipal, and metropolitan assemblies
4. Environmental Protection Agency
5. National Development Planning Commission (NDPC)
6. Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) institutes
7. Faculties of Agriculture in various universities, including the Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research at the University of Ghana
8. Agricultural associations including farmers' associations and organizations, think tanks, and NGOs
9. Specialized support institutions, including Ghana Statistical Services, the Ghana Standards Board, and banks (especially the Agricultural Development Bank and the Rural Banks)
10. Development partners

After a relatively lengthy discussion as to which 15 of these institutions and organizations should be included in the sample, in order to adequately represent all stakeholders, it was decided to increase the number from 15 to 20. Table 1 lists the selected institutions.

**TABLE 1: SAMPLED INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS FOR INTERVIEW**

Policy Research and Analysis Institutions	Policy Process Institutions and Organizations	International Organizations and Development Partners
Statistics, Research and Information Department (SRID), MOFA	Management, Office of the Chief Director, MOFA	International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)
Science and Technology Policy Research Institute (STEPRI), CSIR	METASIP Steering Committee	World Bank
Institute of Agricultural Research, College of Agriculture and Consumer Sciences, Univ. of Ghana	Department of Extension Services, MOFA	Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)
Department of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness, Univ. of Ghana, Legon <sup>1</sup>	Ministry of Trade and Industry (MOTI)	
Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (ISSER), University of Ghana	Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Ministry of Science and Environment	
National Development Planning Commission (NDPC)	Parliamentary Select Committee on Food, Agriculture and Cocoa	
Programme Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Department (PPMED), MOFA	Private Enterprises Foundation (PEF)	
SAKSS and related thematic groups	Ghana Agricultural Workers Union (GAWU), Trade Union Congress	
	Ghana Federation of Agricultural Producers (GFAP)	
	Apex Bank	
<b>Total: 8</b>	<b>Total: 10</b>	<b>Total: 3</b>

Not all of these institutions were reached during the actual survey, however. Those either partially or fully interviewed (via the questionnaires) were: 100 percent of the policy research institutions, 63.6 percent of the policy process institutions and organizations, and 66.7 percent of the international organizations and development partners.

A validation workshop was organized at the MOFA Conference Centre in Accra, after a draft report was presented to the relevant stakeholders. The workshop was attended by Honorable Minister of Agriculture Clement Humado; five of the six SAKSS thematic group coordinators; several directors from MOFA; a member of the METASIP Steering Committee; representatives of CIDA, IFAD, and the World Bank; a representative of ISSER (University of Ghana, Legon); and representatives of a number of farmer organizations. Honorable Minister of Agriculture Clement

<sup>1</sup> The director of the Institute of Agricultural Research of the University of Ghana's College of Agriculture and Consumer Studies suggested that the Department of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness was well-positioned to offer informed responses in addition to what he (the director) provided. Thus, the department was added to the list, bringing the total to 21 institutions (presented in Table 1). Some information was also obtained from departments of agricultural economics at the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology in Kumasi and the University for Development Studies in Tamale.

Humado agreed with most of the findings presented at the workshop then shared with participants his vision for SAKSS and what should be done to ensure efficient METASIP implementation. A SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats) analysis was conducted for both the METASIP Steering Committee and the Ghana SAKSS during the validation workshop. Results of these analyses as well as workshop outcomes and feedback were incorporated into the draft report to produce this final report.



### 3. STAKEHOLDER QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWS: ANALYSIS

All past and present agriculture sector policies and programs have involved several stakeholders, including agricultural workers, farmers, the private sector, civil society, development partners, and others. The organizations selected for the interviews in this study represent the varied interests of these different stakeholders.

#### 3.1. METASIP Implementation

One concern raised by some respondents (that is, stakeholder representatives) was that the new investment plan (METASIP) did not evolve in the same way FASDEP II did—namely that it did not involve in-depth multi-sectoral consultations. Therefore, some ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs) outside of MOFA do not feel ownership of the METASIP. As a result of not including input from relevant MDAs outside the agriculture sector, METASIP is now seeing a low level of cooperation and commitment from these MDAs in its implementation. Some MDAs also claim the METASIP projections were not based on adequate concrete evidence.

It was also pointed out that even though MOFA is the lead ministry with respect to agriculture, it does not have the capacity or skills required to implement some of the METASIP programs, such as Programme 2: Improved Growth in Incomes; Programme 3: Increased Competitiveness; and Programme 5: Science and Technology Applied to Food and Agriculture. These respondents believe that the Ministry of Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Environment, Science and Technology should have been the lead partners for Programmes 3 and 5, respectively. However, because those ministries do not feel ownership of the METASIP, they do not have any obligation to its implementation. Some stakeholders felt strongly that the development of the METASIP should have been handled by the NDPC, which would have adequately involved all agriculture sector stakeholders. This is a strong case and probably indicates limited capacity and skill in policy research and analysis. However, the METASIP was in preparation for almost three years and yet these concerns were not raised during that time, not even at the Agriculture Sector Working Group, attended by a majority of the representatives from development partners.

Despite these internal struggles, cooperation and collaboration for the effective implementation of the METASIP has been aided by the METASIP Steering Committee, which is composed of representatives from major agriculture subsectors.<sup>2</sup> While Steering Committee members' enthusiasm was initially high, it is beginning to diminish due to frustrations with the slow pace of implementation and the actions of some politicians that seemingly disregard the METASIP entirely. Political commitment to the METASIP process has not been as strong as expected by Steering Committee members. It is hoped that the new team of ministers and deputy ministers will show greater commitment to the process.

The roles and responsibilities of the METASIP Steering Committee, as stated in the implementation mechanism document, are as follows:

1. To promote and facilitate agriculture-related awareness and participation of stakeholder groups, each of which are represented by a committee member;
2. To review and adopt annual work plans from the METASIP, including those for the SAKSS node
3. To improve the implementation mechanism by identifying opportunities and constraints

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<sup>2</sup> See Appendix 2 for the composition of the METASIP Steering Committee, members of the SAKSS Secretariat, and the coordinators of the six Thematic Groups.

4. To make recommendations, including relevant policy issues for strategic analysis

These roles and responsibilities require that committee members (a) be high-level professionals in the agricultural and policy analysis domains, (b) have adequate time to commit to their role, and (c) will be provided with adequate resources to undertake these tasks. Indeed, if these tasks are to be performed most effectively, some or all committee members must be working full time on the METASIP implementation; this was not intentional when the committee was established but rather it was designed to coordinate and advise. Therefore, the roles and responsibilities of the METASIP Steering Committee need to be better clarified to ensure effectiveness. If the committee is to act in coordination and advisory capacity then the METASIP/SAKSS Secretariat should provide the committee with the necessary information for deliberation and decision. Presently the Secretariat does not have the human and financial resources to support the Steering Committee in this capacity nor does it have an adequate level of independence and autonomy with respect to the use of funds to obtain the required quality and value information.

Table 2 gives the summary results of the METASIP Steering Committee SWOT analysis conducted at the validation workshop. It is representative of stakeholders' observations, as reported during the data collection interviews.

**TABLE 2: SUMMARY OF SWOT ANALYSIS OF THE METASIP STEERING COMMITTEE**

Strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Rich composition: Representatives are from stakeholder groups with experiences and interest in agriculture.</li> <li>• Members are experienced individuals with a lot of commitment to the METASIP process.</li> <li>• Committee members bring the challenges of their stakeholder groups to discuss at meetings.</li> <li>• With their rich knowledge and experience, they are able to undertake consensus-building on issues affecting group members and disseminate the results.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There is no strong, independent, and well-resourced Secretariat to support the committee, and PPMED staff members who currently run the Secretariat are overburdened in addition to their scheduled duties.</li> <li>• There are inadequate mechanisms for knowledge access, sharing, and feedback.</li> <li>• Some members do not send feedback to stakeholders (their constituents) in spite of availability of platforms.</li> <li>• There is lack of clarity on committee members' tenure.</li> <li>• Decisions made by the committee are not binding in the sector.</li> <li>• Farmers' groups are splintered into factions that affect their effective representation within the agricultural sector.</li> </ul>
Opportunities	Threats
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Members can easily create platforms for information gathering and sharing.</li> <li>• The committee has secretariat support from SAKSS/PPMED.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Committee has no budget but rather depends on availability of PPMED funds.</li> <li>• Work of depends on the commitment of politicians involved, which cannot always be guaranteed.</li> <li>• The committee does not have power to enforce the implementation of its decisions.</li> <li>• The committee needs communications strategies to disseminate information.</li> <li>• The committee members have full-time jobs so cannot address the numerous issues adequately.</li> </ul>

Source: Validation Workshop April 15, 2013.

## 3.2. SAKSS Secretariat and Thematic Groups

The Ghana Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System (SAKSS) supports the METASIP implementation process by ensuring that data analysis, storage, and dissemination occur to improve the design and implementation of policies and strategies. There are six thematic areas corresponding to the six METASIP programs. All thematic area coordinators are currently MOFA staff members, and several stakeholders feel that is not in alignment with the concept of an agriculture sector. According to the SAKSS guidelines, appropriate lead institutions within the whole agriculture sector should be identified to coordinate the relevant thematic groups. There is a feeling among some stakeholders that certain thematic areas would be best handled by other ministries and organizations as indicated earlier. However, as the SWOT analysis of the SAKSS (Table 3) indicates, there are other stakeholders who perceive that having coordinators exclusively from MOFA is a strength.

The main SAKSS issue that emerged from this assessment was that coordinating the work within thematic areas could be streamlined if there was greater coherence that the thematic groups' role is to help the staff be effective at their respective workplaces. The thematic groups have, at varying degrees, some capacity for analytical work, knowledge management, training, coordination, and M&E. That capacity is, however, definitely limited and needs to be strengthened, especially in the areas of data analysis and M&E information use. The M&E information itself seems to be very limited due primarily to inadequate resources for data collection, collation, and analysis. Table 3 gives a summary of the SWOT analysis undertaken on the SAKSS during the validation workshop.

**TABLE 3: SUMMARY OF THE SWOT ANALYSIS OF THE GHANA SAKSS**

Strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Availability of high-level agriculture professionals/human resources</li> <li>• Facilitated by a MOFA staff member who helps with the coordination process</li> <li>• With all six thematic coordinators being MOFA staff members, it helps with the M&amp;E process of the SAKSS.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Respective sector constituents perceive SAKSS work as voluntary, so there is no commitment.</li> <li>• Members perceive additional responsibilities to be burdensome, which alters their commitment and attendance at meetings.</li> <li>• There is a general lack of appreciation of the importance for evidence-based information.</li> <li>• Work overload of coordinators coupled with inadequate motivation is a major weakness.</li> <li>• There is limited funding to host meetings coupled with delays in the release of available funds.</li> <li>• Frequent changes of representatives disrupt effective deliberations at meetings.</li> </ul>
Opportunities	Threats
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There tends to be increasing demand for evidence-based data/information and for information sharing.</li> <li>• There is growing effective collaboration within the agricultural sectors and other sectors.</li> <li>• There are high possibilities of financial support for SAKSS activities.</li> <li>• Opportunities exist for capacity building in policy research, analysis, M&amp;E, and information dissemination.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There tends to be much donor influence on policy and research in the agriculture sector, which can derail the efforts of SAKSS.</li> <li>• Political commitment at the level of government to implement the decisions of SAKSS cannot be guaranteed given past experiences.</li> <li>• Funding could be a problem given the numerous competing demands for scarce development resources.</li> </ul>

Source: Validation Workshop April 15, 2013.

### 3.3. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Agricultural Political Leadership

Responses from most of the stakeholders interviewed indicated difficulty identifying clear strengths in food and agriculture political leadership. However, Ghana's democratic credentials are noteworthy, and several of the politicians are "open, accessible, responsive and ready to be engaged at the personal level," according to one respondent. But, at the institutional or organizational level, politicians seem to be more interested in populist actions. Most respondents point out that agricultural policies and implementation cannot depend on party manifestoes.

Since 1996 to the present, ministers and chief directors (typically political appointees) have not seemed to grasp the full implications of Ghanaians' agricultural needs despite the fact that FASDEP I and II and the METASIP have provided clear indications and directions for the country's sustained development in its agriculture sector. All of the political appointees have been highly qualified individuals but all have been too political in the management and administration of the sector and have not provided any strategic guidance. Stakeholders are unhappy that FASDEP has not yet been translated into any MOFA-specific undertakings. "MOFA has not thought through the FASDEP, and the targets in the METASIP are not achievable," wrote one stakeholder. According to many, it is difficult to see what informed the setting of the targets in the METASIP. "The political leadership of the sector does not even seem to have a grasp of both the FASDEP and the METASIP," wrote another stakeholder.

Another issue that emerged was the lack of any coherent working relationships between different political groups and persons within the agricultural sector. The ministers and the relevant parliamentary select committees, for example, do not seem to be effectively working together toward a common goal. Some of the stakeholders, including some high-level MOFA staff, are not aware of any statutory or non-statutory committees that bring together MOFA management and the Parliamentary Select Committee on Food and Agriculture to discuss agriculture sector issues. That means, even if there are such committees and bodies they are ineffective; there is a need to address the anomalies. It is a general feeling that the political leadership of the agricultural sector has not been responsive and inspiring enough and that is why policies outlined in the FASDEP have not really "taken hold," even after many years.

These criticisms are well intended, but it appears that some are made due to either a lack of information or misinformation. For example, the METASIP targets were set on the basis of elaborate modeling work (Al-Hassan and Diao 2007; Benin and Randriamamonjy 2007; Breisinger et. al. 2008; IFPRI 2007; Bogetic 2007). There have also been several specific MOFA initiatives, such as the Ghana Commercial Agriculture Project (GCAP), and several committees that involve agriculture stakeholders' discussing current issues in the sector. In addition, the Parliamentary Select Committee on Food and Agriculture has the statutory mandate to review and approve the agriculture sector budgets, participate in annual planning, and meet at least twice per year to receive progress reports from the relevant sector ministries.

The real issue, therefore, may not be lack of stakeholder involvement but rather that people who should be aware of all these activities or benefit from their outputs do not know about them. People are likely frustrated about politicians' attitudes toward agriculture in general and the implementation of the METASIP in particular. The level of visibility in the agricultural sector is extremely low, and it might be necessary to establish a strong public relations unit to disseminate relevant information to stakeholders. As evidence, very few MOFA and other agriculture-sector staff members outside the ministerial headquarters in Accra are even aware of the METASIP Steering Committee's

existence. There is also a definite need for greater interactions between stakeholders in the agriculture sector, and the METASIP Steering Committee should organize such interactions through the METASIP/SAKSS Secretariat.

One recommendation to improve political leadership's responsiveness was to develop a long-term agricultural plan that all political parties and the nation as a whole finds agreeable and that is pursued irrespective of which party is in power. Other stakeholders, however, hold the view that politicians will continue to put political considerations high on the agenda and a mere long-term plan cannot solve the problem.

### **3.4. Skills of Agriculture Sector Personnel**

The MOFA and other organizations and units of the agriculture sector seem to have many skilled personnel in the technical areas even though they are limited in numbers especially at the district levels. In most districts, the ratio of agricultural extension agent (AEA) to farmers is still as low as 1:1,500 households (MOFA 2010a). With regards to skills in strategic policy analysis and ability to engage in policy discussions and dialogue, the situation is precarious at the district and even regional levels. From the interviews, there seem not to be more than an average of two persons per region (making a total of 20 persons) at the regional and district levels who can claim to have some skills to engage in agricultural policy discussions and dialogue. At the national level however, where there is concentration of directors and deputy directors, it is being estimated that about 25 persons may be capable of informed agricultural policy discussions and dialogue. We are thus estimating that the agricultural sector of Ghana (excluding research and NDPC) has about 45 persons who have skills to effectively use available evidence and knowledge to engage in agricultural policy discussions and dialogue. That is grossly inadequate especially at the regional and district levels. Agricultural policy discussions and dialogue are important, especially at regional and district levels, to keep the people informed as to why they are being led in particular directions. It is recommended that all regional and district directors of agriculture should have skills in agricultural policy discussions and dialogue.

In terms of agricultural policy analysis, it appears that only about 10 staff members (outside of the national agricultural research system<sup>3</sup> and NDPC) have the requisite training, but it is doubtful if up to five have the skills. Most of these personnel are within MOFA, but the agriculture sector encompasses ministries such as Environment, Science and Technology; Trade and Industry; Lands and Forestry; Roads and Highways; and others. This research indicates that, on average, not more than one person in each of these ministries can claim to be involved in agricultural policy analysis, discussions, and dialogue. Those who handle agricultural related issues in these ministries have very little agricultural policy training and skills. It must be pointed out that even though the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) is part of the Ministry of Environment, Science and Technology, they are not part of the above estimates. STEPRI, the policy research wing of CSIR, is being treated as an entity in this study.

### **3.5. The MOFA M&E System**

The Ministry of Food and Agriculture designed a very elaborate M&E system prior to the METASIP, which has since been incorporated into the investment plan. Based on the responses of various stakeholders, however, the general perception is that the MOFA M&E system is ineffective for several reasons. A 2009 evaluation report of the MOFA M&E system, for example, noted that M&E training had usually been restricted to only some core staff; unless it is extended to many more staff, it will narrow the effectiveness of the M&E system (MOFA 2009). The core staff has been mostly from the MOFA headquarters in Accra and only occasionally did some staff at the regional level benefit.

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<sup>3</sup> The national agricultural research system (NARS) consists of all the agriculture-oriented CSIR institutions as well as university units that undertake agriculture-related research.

The same report also noted that “the planning and budget process used by MOFA is not results oriented, making it difficult to monitor the relationship between expenditure and outputs” and also that “the MOFA M&E documentation and matrix frequently fail to demonstrate the fundamental cause and effect linkages which provide a sound basis for an evaluation system.” It went further to explain that “many M&E staff interviewed had either not been trained in cause-effect analysis or had ceased to use it” and that “the system does not differentiate clearly between data on change (Outcomes and Impact) and data on the means to achieve these changes (Outputs).”

Not much has changed since these observations were made in 2009. Very inadequate funding for agriculture sector M&E activities and indeed all the data generation, analysis, and dissemination activities as well as staff attrition were also pointed out as critical problems. Because of these and other shortcomings, even if M&E information exists, it does not significantly influence strategic planning and modification of policies and programs.

Annual joint agricultural sector reviews include reports of activities across the sector, and these have been useful in influencing strategic planning and modification of policies and programs to some degree. There is, however, a lot of room for improvement in the information usually presented at such review meetings; the analysis generally lacks depth as most information is presented in its “raw” form. Thus, the information is of limited use with regards to M&E, which requires analyzed data.

Research studies have been commissioned to obtain specific information for policy formulation and planning. It is, however, difficult to see the influence of most of such research in policies and plans. Stakeholders may be right in claiming that METASIP was not based on much policy research and analysis, given the fact that most commissioned studies do not provide much evidence-based information. Many of the researchers provide consultancy reports (as opposed to research reports), which typically are not required to produce evidence-based information. The agriculture sector needs to execute a full review of commissioned research and consultancies to ensure quality of evidence-based information.

Effective internal management and evaluation is one way to generate information in order to change or modify policies and undertake strategic planning. But there are hardly any formal meetings of MOFA (and other agriculture sector) staff members that are called to critically reflect on the performance of the various departments and sections of the sector. Even when opportunities arise for staff to raise issues at meetings, very few people are able to speak up about things that reflect poorly on the government because they feel they will be seen to be criticizing their leaders, the political appointees (ministers and chief directors). Even though no example can be cited here, some respondents believe that political appointees do not take criticisms of their actions lightly—to the extent that good ideas from staff members get ignored if they differ from the thinking of top management. Some members of staff do complain unofficially of being sidelined for pointing out areas that they believe need modifications or change. For example, many MOFA staff members have been unhappy with the appointment of almost all chief directors to the ministry, believing them to be political appointees rather than seasoned administrators or managers.

The various ministries that are major stakeholders in the food and agricultural sector stay in touch through committees and boards. Obtaining information from farmers, fishers, and other key stakeholders is not done on a regular basis, however. There are several well-organized farmer organizations that can supply information about their activities, but most farmers’ voices are not heard because they are not adequately represented by their apex bodies. Also, there is a general perception by several agriculture sector stakeholders that many leaders of farmers’ associations and organizations (at the apex level, in particular) have lost touch with the people they purport to represent. While some leaders disagree with this view, of course, evidence supports the claim that governance in many farmers’ organizations and associations is poor. There is a general lack of transparency and accountability, and

leadership change has been difficult for most of them. According to several respondents, farmers' organizations and associations need a lot of capacity building in how to implement and maintain good governance.

### 3.6. Capability to Deliver Mandate

Most of the stakeholders do not think agriculture sector organizations (MOFA as well as departments and units in other ministries that constitute the agricultural sector) have the capacity to deliver on their mandate. The personnel equipped to ensure mandate delivery are overstretched, so their actual capability to deliver is greatly constrained. While the METASIP is the main investment plan, smaller-scale work plans and budgets are needed to manage the day-to-day operations of staff; such operational plans do not exist. Operational mechanisms are either ineffective or diminishing, and staff motivation is very low. Throughout most of 2012, for example, extension workers in most districts did not receive any funds for fuel.

The METASIP Steering Committee—which has been charged to oversee the implementation of the METASIP—is composed of people from all the major stakeholder groups, including ministries, departments, and agencies working in the agricultural sector, the private sector (for example, farmers, processors, traders), and civil society. They have all indicated a willingness to work to ensure impact, but they are largely constrained in several ways as discussed earlier. Many of them are also getting frustrated by certain actions (or, alternatively, inactions) of the sector's political leadership. In addition, several committee members are greatly worried by the very slow pace of the METASIP implementation process. Many of them believe the key issue is fund allocation or, more generally, the availability of funds to implement the plan. In the past couple of years, government allocation to the agriculture sector has not been enough to implement even one of the well-designed METASIP programs.

There are several other drawbacks to implementation, too, including the general attitude of those who work in MOFA and other ministries—a comment shared by several MOFA staff members. Leadership is not thought to be transparent enough and thus does not inspire hard work and initiatives. The METASIP Steering Committee members have virtually no evidence-based information to work with, so the well-designed M&E system is merely a design because there is hardly any relevant information to evaluate. In any case, top management of the agriculture sector does not also seem to care about M&E information. If they did, they would demand it. Thus, the main problem may be traced to the lack of demand for evidence-based information by those who should need it. The METASIP Steering Committee needs to make the necessary demands for information to set in motion the data supply-and-demand process in the agriculture sector.

While the government's research organization, the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), is mandated to generate research information to help execute government policies, according to a member of the CSIR Board, the Ministry of Environment, Science and Technology did not give any research funds to the CSIR in 2012. This shows a clear lack of any research policy at the national level, especially for agriculture. It means also that development partners are dictate both the funding and the agenda of research in Ghana, which would be acceptable if donor-supported studies served the country's priority research areas. However, the lack of support for policy research, analysis, and dissemination tends to indicate that some priority research areas are being ignored. This may be because no group or organization has been tasked specifically with coordinating agricultural policy research and analysis. The Ghana SAKSS is then welcome to serve that purpose.

### **3.7. Engagement in Networks, Alliances, and Collaborative Efforts**

All agriculture sector organizations (mainly MOFA departments and units in other ministries) have engaged external groups (mainly development partners) in the development of policies and strategies. As mentioned earlier, the FASDEP was greatly supported by development partners and other organizations. NEPAD (through CAADP), ECOWAS (through ECOWAP), the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and several other organizations have contributed significantly to the development of the METASIP. The Agriculture Sector Working Group (ASWG), which meets regularly to review sector-wide progress, allows MOFA, other agriculture sector stakeholders, and development partners to collaborate. The ASWG offers opportunities for effective policy discussions and dialogue between Ghana government agencies and development partners with the main aim of “accelerating agricultural modernization” as stated in the Ghana Shared Growth Development Agenda I (2010–13) prepared by the NDPC (NDPC 2012).

### **3.8. Mechanisms for Coherence in the Food and Agricultural Sector**

The various departments and organizations within MOFA have their stated visions and missions and they endeavor to operationalize them as much as possible. There is, however, no evidence that staff of the departments actually discuss these mechanisms and no indication that they have ever been revised. There are also no written operational guidelines with respect to how to achieve policy and strategy coherence in the food and agriculture sector.

Overall, coherence in the agriculture sector is often challenged by the growing tendency of development partners to launch and support programs that run parallel to the efforts of the agricultural sector. In fact, such actions seem to undermine the whole development process. For example, some development partners establish agricultural and rural development programs by working directly with regional coordinating councils (RCCs) and district assemblies (DAs) thereby engaging in little or no collaboration with key government ministries such agriculture, health, and education. Until there is a complete decentralization and devolution of authority of these ministries and a vast strengthening of RCCs and DAs, any attempt to work with RCCs and DAs in technical areas will be futile and considered outside the policies, plans, and strategies of Ghana’s government. It is generally agreed that agricultural and rural development efforts that are not “country-led and country-owned” do not achieve anything, no matter how much money and other resources are used. That said, even with decentralization, there is still a need for the expertise of the “mother” ministries and a reliance on their ability to supervise technical programs at the local level; without this relationship, performance will be greatly compromised.

According to one of the stakeholder representative respondents, “Ghana’s decentralization process is a mess.” Many think that is because development efforts have become overly politicized, even at the lower levels. The chief executives at the metropolitan, municipal, and district levels seem to respond to mainly political interests.



## 4. HUMAN CAPACITY FOR AGRICULTURAL POLICY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION: ACHIEVEMENTS AND GAPS

### 4.1. Policy Research and Analysis Organizations and Staffing Situations

Agricultural policy research and analysis organizations in Ghana—both actual and potential—can be said to include the NDPC, the SRID of MOFA, STEPRI of the CSIR, the departments of agricultural economics of the various universities, ISSER of the University of Ghana, and the PPMED of MOFA. Table 4 indicates their rankings with regards to their areas of expertise. As indicated in the table, NDPC, SRID, STEPRI, and ISSER (Legon) all indicate that policy research and analysis is their number one area of expertise while the departments of agricultural economics of the universities indicate that policy research and analysis is second only to teaching. The results imply that if all these institutions/organizations are fully staffed with appropriately skilled workers and equipped with the necessary facilities, they would be able to undertake the required agricultural policy research and analysis to aid policy formulation and implementation.

Senior (technical) personnel situation, in the various policy research and analysis oriented institutions and organizations in the country, is presented in Table 5. It must be noted that not every research-oriented staff member in these institutions has the capacity and/or skill for policy research and analysis. The reality is that only a fraction of those with requisite academic qualifications are working on agricultural policy research and analysis. Those actually involved in agricultural policy research and analysis are estimated at about a quarter of what has been presented—some argue even less than that (see Table 7).

The institutions and organizations could not state their “planned staff numbers” to compare with their actual numbers given in Table 5. Thus, it was not possible to arrive at specific shortfalls in terms of numbers of personnel. Governments over the years have had very strict conditions for recruiting new staff and thus most of the heads of the institutions do not see the need to be making yearly requests for staff when hardly any are approved. In almost all of the institutions/organizations, they are only allowed to replace staff members who have left their services. New staff can only be engaged after a very strong case is made as to the desirability of doing so. That means the most feasible way of improving the capacity of the institutions/organizations in agricultural policy research and analysis is by providing current staff with the necessary training and skills although the present analysis strongly suggests that engaging more staff is also needed.

**TABLE 4: RANKING OF ORGANIZATIONS' AREAS OF EXPERTISE**

Institution/Organization	Policy Research & Analysis	Program Management, M&E	Knowledge Management	Teaching and None-policy Research	Human Resource Management	Other
NDPC	1	2	–	3	–	–
SRID	1	–	–	–	–	–
STEPRI	1	2	3	–	–	–
University agricultural economics departments	1	–	3	1	–	–
IAR, UG, Legon	4	–	3	1	2	–
ISSER, UG, Legon	1	–	–	2	–	–
PPMED of MOFA	–	1	2	–	–	–

Source: Capacity Needs Assessment Survey 2012/2013.

Note: Ranking number is based on self-reported top priority area for institution/organization. NDPC = National Development Planning Commission; SRID = Statistics, Research and Information Department; STEPRI = Science and Technology Policy Research Institute of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research; IAR = Institute for Agricultural Research (University of Ghana); ISSER = Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (University of Ghana); PPMED of MOFA = Programme Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Department of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture.

It must also to be noted that a couple of think tanks, such as the Centre for Economic Policy Analysis (CEPA) and the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), sometimes undertake agricultural policy research and analysis. That has been on an ad-hoc basis, however.

**TABLE 5: STAFFING IN AGRICULTURAL POLICY RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS INSTITUTIONS, BY GENDER**

Institution/Organization	PhD		MSc / MPhil		BSc		Total (2012)	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
NDPC	6	2	3	1	1	0	10	4
SRID	0	0	6	3	1	1	7	4
STEPRI	3	0	7	4	0	1	10	5
University agricultural economics departments	16	3	18	5	–	–	34	8
IAR, UG, Legon	2	0	3	2	–	–	5	2
ISSER, UG, Legon	2	2	11	3	10	4	23	9
PPMED of MOFA	0	1	7	4	8	5	15	10
<b>Total</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>104</b>	<b>42</b>

Source: Capacity Needs Assessment Survey 2012/2013.

Note: NDPC = National Development Planning Commission; SRID = Statistics, Research and Information Department; STEPRI = Science and Technology Policy Research Institute of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research; IAR = Institute for Agricultural Research (University of Ghana); ISSER = Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (University of Ghana); PPMED of MOFA = Programme Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Department of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture.

Table 6 gives estimates of the percentage of time spent on various activities by the existing senior (technical) personnel. It indicates that considerable time is spent on research and analysis compared with other areas, such as teaching, training, M&E, and others. It is difficult to agree fully with the information in the table since agricultural policy research and analysis output from all the institutions suggest otherwise. Most of them had difficulties stating the exact output quantities in terms of works produced and disseminated. It is perceived that much less time is actually spent on agricultural policy research and analysis, an observation that has largely been corroborated by a number of interviewed personnel. Most of them do not have the amount of time indicated in Table 7 to spend on research and analysis, which at least partially explains why staff members with potential for agricultural policy research and analysis are not actually engaged in it. Many staff members agreed that they actually spend considerably more time in administrative and management duties.

**TABLE 6: PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT IN RESEARCH/ANALYSIS AND NON-RESEARCH ACTIVITIES**

Institution/ Organization	Research/ Analysis	Teaching/ Training	Extension	Advocacy	M&E	Knowledge Management	Other	Total
NDPC	20	0	0	5	40	5	30 <sup>4</sup>	100
SRID	20	10	5	5	40	20	0	100
STEPRI	50	10	5	5	15	15	0	100
University agricultural economics departments	25	50	10	5	5	5	0	100
IAR, UG, Legon	35	25	15	2	8	15	0	100
ISSER, UG, Legon	60	20	5	5	10	0	0	100
PPMED of MOFA	30	10	10	10	30	10	0	100
<b>Average percentage</b>	<b>34.29</b>	<b>17.86</b>	<b>7.14</b>	<b>5.29</b>	<b>21.14</b>	<b>10.00</b>	<b>4.29</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Capacity Needs Assessment Survey 2012/2013.

Note: NDPC = National Development Planning Commission; SRID = Statistics, Research and Information Department; STEPRI = Science and Technology Policy Research Institute of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research; IAR = Institute for Agricultural Research (University of Ghana); ISSER = Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (University of Ghana); PPMED of MOFA = Programme Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Department of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture.

Except for SRID of MOFA, the other organizations spend about 20 to 35 percent of the time indicated on agricultural policy research and analysis. According to the staff, however, it is difficult to distinguish the time spent on agricultural policy research and analysis and that spent on policy research and analysis of other sectors. Indeed it is not so easy to distinguish time spent on the various areas listed in the table.

Table 7 gives a much better idea of how much effort is actually put into agricultural policy research, analysis, and planning in the various institutions and organizations. Only 37 out of 146 potential agricultural policy researchers and analysts (25.34 percent) actually undertook some policy research, analysis, and planning in the past two years. The degree of their involvement has not been captured but, given the available output, one may conclude that several of the 37 people were not very active participants.

Table 7 indicates that there is a considerable gap in volume, training, and skills for agricultural policy research, analysis, and investment planning. Also the implication of the information in Table 7 is that there is limited demand

<sup>4</sup> See Table 3.

for results of agricultural policy research and analysis. The agricultural sector ministries and other organizations that would find information from policy research and analysis useful do not seem to be demanding any information. It follows that they do not use much evidence-based information in policymaking. Therefore, it's necessary for relevant governmental and nongovernmental agencies as well as development partners to not only demand but adequately fund agricultural sector information generation and analysis.

It is informative that when the institutions and organizations were asked about their level of financial security, 85.7 percent indicated they were "financially insecure" while the rest (14.3 percent) said they were far worse off ("financially very insecure"). All of the institutions including the universities complained of a "chronic" lack of funds for any kind of research. They pointed out that it is worse for policy research and analysis because its results are often less visible.

## **4.2. Knowledge Management and Sharing**

With regards to knowledge management and sharing, all the institutions and the organizations listed in the tables have the potential, but many lack skilled staff members with the necessary expertise. Knowledge management involves generating and assembling needed knowledge from relevant sources in ways that can not only be understood but also used in the design, implementation, and evaluation of programs and projects. Capacity in almost all institutions is highly inadequate for generating, accessing, and disseminating knowledge products.

Respondents provided very limited information for so analysis of outputs is weak. What information does exist indicates generally low output of agricultural policy research and analysis activities in the past two years (Table 8). The fact that most of the institutions did not provide the information is probably an indication of their own dissatisfaction with the output. The many reasons for this situation range from lack of funding to limited demand to limited researcher skills.

**TABLE 7: EXISTING CAPACITIES FOR AGRICULTURAL POLICY RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS AND CONSTRAINTS**

Institution	Estimated staff involved directly or potentially in agricultural policy research, analysis, investment planning	Estimated staff involved directly or potentially in agricultural policy research, analysis, and investment planning in past 2 years	Main reasons given for why those with potential are not undertaking policy research and analysis.
NDPC	14	6	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Involved in other areas</li> <li>2. Overstretched</li> <li>3. No opportunity</li> </ol>
SRID	11	3	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Involved in administration and other activities so no time for research and analysis</li> <li>2. Policy research and analysis not well understood; not sure have the skills</li> </ol>
STEPRI	15	6	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Few staff members in the area are overstretched</li> <li>2. Not very certain potential staff have the appropriate skills for policy research and analysis</li> </ol>
Agricultural economics departments in public universities	42	10	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. No opportunity; opportunities usually given to foreign consultants and international organizations such as IFPRI</li> <li>2. Overburdened with teaching responsibilities</li> <li>3. MOFA and its projects not interested in expertise from the local universities</li> <li>4. Older academic staff members are not well versed in new technologies.</li> </ol>
IAR, UG, Legon	7	4	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Too many other commitments</li> <li>2. Not sure of available skills</li> </ol>
ISSER, UG, Legon	22	3	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Few staff members in the area of agricultural policy</li> <li>2. Several others without skills for policy research and analysis</li> </ol>
PPMED of MOFA	25	5	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Overstretched</li> <li>2. Involved heavily in administration</li> </ol>
<b>Total</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>37</b>	

Source: Capacity Needs Assessment Survey 2012/2013.

Note: NDPC = National Development Planning Commission; SRID = Statistics, Research and Information Department; STEPRI = Science and Technology Policy Research Institute of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research; IAR = Institute for Agricultural Research (University of

Ghana); ISSER = Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (University of Ghana); PPMED of MOFA = Programme Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Department of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture.

**TABLE 8: AGRICULTURAL POLICY RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS OUTPUTS AND DISSEMINATION**

Outputs and Dissemination	NDPC	SRID	STEPRI	University agricultural economics departments	ISSER, UG, Legon	IAR, UG, Legon	PPMED of MOFA
1. Number of food and agricultural policy research analysis projects undertaken in last 2 years	7	10	6	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2. Food and agriculture analysis research projects developed with communication strategy in last 2 years	3	0	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
3. Number of public consultations on food and agriculture policy issues in last 2 years	1	0	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
4. Number of policy dialogues on food and agriculture conducted in past 2 years	Many (over 20)	0	4	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
5. Number of policy dialogues on food and agriculture participated in past 2 years	2 (apart from 4 above)	0	18 (apart from 4 above)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
6. Number of times participated in discussions on global, regional, and continental food and agriculture issues	0	2	4	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Source: Capacity Needs Assessment Survey 2012/2013.

Note: NDPC = National Development Planning Commission; SRID = Statistics, Research and Information Department; STEPRI = Science and Technology Policy Research Institute of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research; ISSER = Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (University of Ghana); IAR = Institute for Agricultural Research (University of Ghana); PPMED of MOFA = Programme Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Department of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture; N/A = not available.

There is also very little organized knowledge management and sharing mechanisms within and across ministries. In any case, linkages between them are weak. Many departments and institutions tend to prefer to work in isolation. Even within MOFA, there is minimal collaboration between departments. This problem of minimal collaboration and coordination of institutions in the agriculture sector informed the sixth component (objective) in FASDEP II and the METASIP—namely “Improved Institutional Coordination.” There must be a concerted effort to achieve it, by MOFA in particular, which means that agricultural policy knowledge management and sharing structures have to be established and capacities strengthened.

## 5. ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY FOR AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION

### 5.1. General Assessment of Roles and Responsibilities of State and None-State Organizations

The Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA) is the lead agency mandated to see to the development and implementation of agricultural policies, strategies, programs, and projects in the agricultural sector. Thus, the main organizational capacity being assessed here is that of MOFA and the state and none-state organizations it's linked to.

The main departments within MOFA involved in policy research and analysis, knowledge management and sharing, and monitoring and evaluation include: MOFA management (ministers, chief directors, and office staff); the Statistics, Research and Information Department (SRID); the Programme Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Department (PPMED); and, to some extent, all of the technical directorates at the headquarters in Accra. Regional and district directorates do undertake some supervision and monitoring but it is generally routine. There is also a growing realization of the need for participatory policy implementation and participatory M&E, which implies the involvement of civil society, the organized private sector, farmers, processors, and others in policy processes. The 2009 MOFA M&E evaluation report did emphasize the need for sector staff training in participatory impact monitoring (MOFA 2009). The METASIP implementation process has adopted the annual joint agriculture sector review as a major aspect of its policy dialogue strategy and an important step toward addressing the exclusion of major stakeholders in the planning and review processes.

Presently SRID is charged with providing analyzed data and information while PPMED is responsible for policy planning and M&E. These two departments are strong at the headquarters but completely absent at the district level. That means there is complete lack of capacity for participatory planning and M&E at the district level; rather personnel are expected to receive backstopping from the poorly staffed regional directorates of agriculture and/or the headquarters level. The staff members at the national level are so overstretched that it is impossible to depend on them for planning and M&E backstopping. This clearly shows a huge gap in organizational capacity. Indeed, the current organizational system cannot effectively provide evidence-based information from the community level nor can it effectively implement a useful M&E system. The only other body (indeed the main organization) that collects and analyzes agricultural information is the Ghana Statistical Services (GSS). Most of its data are of an aggregate nature, however. It carries out household and demographic surveys every five years, which contain some agricultural data, but the few enumeration areas usually used to generate them prevents their use for micro-level planning.

The current organizational system does not allow for effective data generation or M&E from ministries that have agricultural functions as well as agricultural and rural development-oriented NGOs and the private sector. There is no organizational structure that compels any organization to provide any agricultural related information. The NGOs, the private sector (including foreign organizations), and quite often some development partners seem to operate as if they are completely independent of the state. Such a system is definitely a recipe for confusion and propagation of underdevelopment.

SRID has been able to provide routine agricultural data for several years even though many people are uncomfortable with some of the data provided. There is a need to put more credibility into the data collection process but somehow agricultural information, such as livestock population data, continues to be absent.

Coordination between SRID and other agricultural data generation institutions—such as the agricultural research institutions and university agriculture departments—is virtually absent. That means that SRID is not taking advantage of better analytical tools that might have been developed and made available at the research institutions. This problem may be resolved as the Ghana SAKSS node and its thematic groups obtain more experience and make necessary changes in their operations; SRID and the research institutes are key members of the SAKSS node. Also, as one of the respondents from MOFA pointed out, there is a need for agricultural policy analysis concepts and policy issues to be taught in the universities to all agricultural students.

## 5.2. Organizational Capacity for Investment Planning and Implementation

The two main state agencies responsible for agricultural related investment planning are the NDPC and the PPMED of MOFA; they receive considerable contributions from all agriculture sector stakeholders. SRID of MOFA as well as GSS in particular provide considerable information as the basis for the planning process. Staff members of other agricultural policy oriented institutions—such as universities, research institutions, and international research institutions like IFPRI—are usually used as consultants either to provide evidence-based information or to take part in drafting the investment plan.

This study indicates that the organizational structure for the production of the METASIP could have been much better if the two main state agencies, NDPC and PPMED, collaborated more closely. That can also be said of the production of the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (SGDA) by NDPC. There is a difference between working together to produce an investment plan and being invited to participate in producing an investment plan. Major stakeholders should not be merely invited to take part; they should be partners in the overall planning process.

MOFA, as stated earlier, is not the only ministry in the agriculture sector. Thus information and full participation of other key state stakeholders—including the ministries of Trade and Industry; Land and Forestry; and the Environment, Science and Technology, and others—are very critical in the investment planning (and implementation) process. The same can be said of well-established agricultural oriented NGOs, such as the Association of Church Development Projects (ACDEP), which operates in all parts of northern Ghana.

It is often stated that the private sector is the engine of growth of modern economies. The private sector's role, therefore, in organizing investment planning processes must be prominent in terms of provision of evidence-based information and a plan for growth. It is true that the Ghanaian “agricultural private sector” is not well organized and can indeed bring some confusion into the planning process, but the sector's stakeholders would be very incomplete if this sector were excluded. We indeed have several “private sectors” in the agriculture sector, and the major ones need to be actively involved in any investment planning process.

With regards to implementing the agriculture investment plan, the stakeholders are even greater in numbers. With a good investment plan, however, it is the government's will and commitment that moves the process forward. Thus politicians are very critical in whether the plan will be implemented or not. The experience of the METASIP clearly indicates the critical role of the politician is to get the process moving. There must be a firm commitment to be nonpartisan and nondiscriminatory to successfully implement an agricultural investment plan. That definitely is a difficult and potentially impossible task. As a nation, however, Ghana has difficult choices to make as to whether it wants economic growth and, if so, how it's going to achieve it.



### 5.3. Effectiveness and Efficiency of the Organizations and Suggestions for Improvement

It is usually said that effectiveness is “doing the right things,” and efficiency is “doing things right.” Several of our policy-oriented institutions and organizations not only “do things wrong” (that is, inefficiently) but also “do wrong things” (that is, are ineffective). Many factors and constraints contribute to this effectiveness and efficiency problem, including human, material, and other resource constraints. The human resource constraints usually make them ineffective while the other constraints make them inefficient.

Table 9 gives an indication of the types of human resource constraints that exist in the agricultural policy research and analysis institutions and organizations. According to the stakeholders, both quantity and quality of personnel are important constraints even though they regard the former as a larger problem. About 86 percent of respondents agree that “quantity of human capital” is a constraint while 42.8 percent say that “quality of human capital” is a constraint. Human capital retention is a problem in all except the universities and institutions/units within them. This is largely because the conditions of service in the universities are much better than in the other organizations. Better conditions of service and increased motivation are required in the NDPC, CSIR, and ministries to retain qualified staff. It is also necessary to distinguish researchers from other staff since job descriptions differ very significantly.

**TABLE 9: HUMAN RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS IN POLICY RESEARCH/ANALYSIS ORGANIZATIONS**

Constraints	Degree of Agreement by Heads of Policy Research/Analysis Institutions/Organizations in Ghana (%)					
	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Total
Quality of human capital	–	42.8	28.6	28.6	–	100
Quantity of human capital	–	85.7	14.3	–	–	100
Management of human capital	–	–	71.4	28.6	–	100
Human capital retention*	28.6	28.6	–	42.8	–	100
Effectiveness utilization of human capital	–	–	85.7	14.3	–	100

Source: Capacity Needs Assessment Survey 2012/2013.

Note: \* = Universities and their institutes are those with little or no human capital retention constraints.

Facilities for agricultural policy research, analysis, and dissemination are also serious constraints. The main facilities include environments with adequate logistics, computers, software, libraries, Internet services, and secretarial and material support. Table 10 gives indication of some of the facilities that are available in the various agricultural policy research and analysis institutions and organizations. Most have relatively adequate computer hardware but face challenges with the availability and use of analytical software as can be deduced from Tables 11 and 12. Many computers, especially laptops, are owned by individual researchers as the desktops provided by the institutions/organizations are gradually shifting out of use. Vehicles are also a necessary facility for field research, especially in rural areas with difficult terrain. Unfortunately for most of the institutions, vehicles have been a major constraint, with the few they do own not safe or advisable for field work. Rugged, cross-country vehicles are required for field activities at all the institutions surveyed, but especially SRID and PPMED for their M&E activities in extremely remote areas.

**TABLE 10: RELEVANT FACILITIES AVAILABLE IN VARIOUS INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS**

Facility	Computers with word processing software		Computers with analytical software		Vehicles		Physical space adequate?
	Actual	Needed	Actual	Needed	Actual	Needed	
NDPC	64*	100*	–	–	31	41	No
SRID	27	35	27	35	8	13**	No
STEPRI	36	40	36	36	4	8	Yes
University agricultural economics departments	Many	N/A	Many	N/A	N/A	N/A	No
IAR, UG, Legon	2	3	7	10	N/A	N/A	No
ISSER, UG, Legon	12	N/A	12	N/A	N/A	N/A	Yes
PPMED of MOFA	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	5	10**	N/A

Source: Capacity Needs Assessment Survey 2012/2013.

Note: No institution indicated that it had computers with bibliographic management software. \* = Computers with word processing and analytical software. \*\* = Four-wheel-drive-type vehicles are needed for work in very bad terrains; three for SRID and three for PPMED are necessary. The rest can be pick-ups.

Note: NDPC = National Development Planning Commission; SRID = Statistics, Research and Information Department; STEPRI = Science and Technology Policy Research Institute of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research; IAR = Institute for Agricultural Research (University of Ghana); ISSER = Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (University of Ghana); PPMED of MOFA = Programme Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Department of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture; N/A = not available

Table 11 indicates that Microsoft Excel and SPSS (statistical software) are the main analytical software used in all institutions. Based on the table, SPSS is less popular, which implies that only basic analytical work is being carried out by policy researchers. This may be because basic analysis is all that is demanded or even required. The bigger problem is staff's limited knowledge in the use of even basic software. Constant refresher training is required for personnel of these institutions and organizations.

Internet services are critical for agricultural policy research and analysis and, while all of the institutions and organizations have access to the Internet, the quality of these services varies. The NDPC and STEPRI have the fastest Internet services among the institutions and the MOFA departments have the slowest (Table 12).

**TABLE 11: ANALYTICAL SOFTWARE USED BY MOST TECHNICAL STAFF OF POLICY RESEARCH/ANALYSIS ORGANIZATIONS**

Institution/Organization	Used Daily	Used 2–3 Times/Week	Used Monthly	Used Quarterly
NDPC	EXCEL	–	–	SPSS, E-VIEWS
SRID	EXCEL	–	SPSS	–
STEPRI	EXCEL	SPSS		STATA
University agricultural economics departments	EXCEL	SPSS	–	STATA
ISSER, UG, Legon	STATA, SPSS, EXCEL	–	–	–
IAR, UG, Legon	EXCEL	–	SPSS	SAS
PPMED of MOFA	EXCEL	–	SPSS	–

Source: Capacity Needs Assessment Survey 2012/2013.

Note: Most software is installed in personal laptops rather than office computers. NDPC = National Development Planning Commission; SRID = Statistics, Research and Information Department; STEPRI = Science and Technology Policy Research Institute of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research; ISSER = Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (University of Ghana); IAR = Institute for Agricultural Research (University of Ghana); PPMED of MOFA = Programme Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Department of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture.

**TABLE 12: PERFORMANCE OF INTERNET SERVICES**

Institution/Organization	Rating of Internet Connection	Length of Time Required for Website to Load (office computer)	Length of Time Required to Download a 1-MB File
NDPC	Fast	5–14 seconds	5–14 seconds
SRID	Slow	2 minutes (approx.)	2 minutes (approx.)
STEPRI	Fast	30–59 seconds	14–29 seconds
University agricultural economics departments	Moderate	30–59 seconds	30–59 seconds
ISSER, UG, Legon	Moderate	30–59 seconds	30–59 seconds
IAR, UG, Legon	Moderate	5–14 seconds	14–29 seconds
PPMED of MOFA	Slow	2 minutes (approx.)	2 minutes (approx.)

Source: Capacity Needs Assessment Survey 2012/2013.

Note: NDPC = National Development Planning Commission; SRID = Statistics, Research and Information Department; STEPRI = Science and Technology Policy Research Institute of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research; ISSER = Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (University of Ghana); IAR = Institute for Agricultural Research (University of Ghana); PPMED of MOFA = Programme Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Department of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture.

## 5.4. Assessment of Existing Data and M&E Systems and Suggestions for Improvement

The generation of agricultural statistics has been quite a difficult task. SRID and the GSS have been providing quite high-quality agricultural statistics annually although in limited quantity. The *Agriculture in Ghana* and *Facts and Figures* pamphlets, which are published regularly by SRID, have been widely accepted as useful. SRID has also been consistent in obtaining weekly price information on inputs and food commodities from across the country. The use of cell phones and the Internet has been very useful in that respect. Crop production statistics are also obtained using specially trained agricultural extension agents (AEAs) at various locations in the country. The process of obtaining all this information and data (for the crop production subsector) are in place, but there is a great need to improve them. Logistics at the field level are so poor that AEAs are known to trek in high-risk environments for several kilometers to take field measurements that can estimate yields and outputs. As one would expect, motivation of AEAs is critically low and one gets suspicious that some of the data sent to the regional and national offices do not come from actual field estimations, given the high risk to obtain them there. Supervision at the district level is almost nonexistent.

Generation of livestock production statistics has been very problematic. There has been a need for a livestock census for a very long time but the resources for that have not been forthcoming. Some regional and district directors have used quite ingenious ways of obtaining some livestock information. This has been quite prominent in the Brong Ahafo region, but questions have been raised about methodologies used especially by the Veterinary Services Department of MOFA. PPMED tried obtaining some livestock estimates through a survey, but several people have

also been very critical of the methodology used so estimates from that survey are not being used (MOFA 2010a). There is a critical need to obtain acceptable livestock statistics for the nation if livestock is to be part of the planning process.

Every institution and organization recognizes the importance of monitoring and evaluation (M&E), but institutionalizing and operationalizing these systems can be very problematic. As indicated in Table 11, most of the policy research and analysis institutions and organizations do not have a fully functioning M&E system. As a consequence, M&E reports are not being produced regularly in several of the institutions; those that are produced are not good enough, as admitted by a number of the organizations (Table 13). Most of the institutions and organizations (71.4 percent) do not have adequate capacity for data collection, analysis, reporting, and sharing. Only ISSER and to some extent STEPRI have reasonably good capacity for data analysis and reporting. ISSER has consistently produced the *State of the Ghanaian Economy* report since 1992, with an extensive feature on the agriculture sector. The current coordinator of the report is an agricultural economist.

**TABLE 13: STATUS OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS IN POLICY-ORIENTED INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS**

M&E Issues	Degree of Agreement by Heads of Policy Research/Analysis Institutions/Organizations in Ghana (%)					
	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Total
1. Organization/institution has a fully functioning M&E System.	–	14.4	42.8	42.8	–	100
2. Organization/institution produces M&E reports periodically.	–	57.1	28.6	14.3	–	100
3. M&E reports are functional for learning purposes.	–	28.6	42.8	28.6	–	100
4. Organization/institution has adequate capacity for data collection.	–	28.6	–	42.8	28.6	100
5. Organization/institution has adequate capacity for data processing.	–	28.6	–	71.4	–	100
6. Organization/institution has adequate capacity for data analysis.	–	28.6	–	57.1	14.3	100
7. Organization/institution has adequate capacity for data reporting and sharing.	–	28.6	–	71.4	–	100
8. Quality of human capacity is a constraint.	–	14.4	42.8	42.8	–	100
9. Quantity of human capacity is a constraint.	14.3	28.6	42.8	14.3	–	100
10. Adequate funding for regular data collection is a constraint.	100.0	–	–	–	–	100
11. Leadership is a constraint.	14.2	28.6	28.6	28.6	–	100
12. Problems relating to data collection, management, and distribution are challenges.	14.3	71.4	–	14.3	–	100

Source: Capacity Needs Assessment Survey 2012/2013.

Many of the institutions and organizations do not agree that the quality of human capacity for M&E is a constraint even though they concede that *quantity* of human capacity could be a serious constraint. That is consistent with

what's shown in Table 9. Many organizations indeed have nonfunctioning M&E systems, mainly because of the cost involved in maintaining the systems. The systems need to be modernized using information and communications technology to make information gathering, transmission, analysis, and dissemination easy, effective, and efficient.

## 5.5. Assessment of Existing Knowledge Management Systems and Suggestions for Improvement

Knowledge management as stated in Section 4.2 involves the generation and assemblage of needed knowledge from relevant sources in ways they can be understood and used. According to the policy research and analysis institutions and organizations, the main stakeholders (in order of importance) who require the knowledge they generate or assemble are listed in Table 14. Clearly the ministries and donors are the most important stakeholders. That is understandable since they have the greatest influences in policymaking in the agriculture sector.

**TABLE 14: STAKEHOLDERS OF AGRICULTURAL POLICY RESEARCH ANALYSIS INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS (RANKED)**

Stakeholders	NDPC	SRID	STEPRI	University Agricultural Economics Departments	ISSER, Legon	IAR, Legon	PPMED of MOFA
Ministries (government)	1	1	1	2	2	2	1
Parliament groups	4	2	–	–	–	–	6
National planning commission and other public organization	–	3	3	5	–	–	3
NGOs/CSOs	3	6	5	3	–	4	5
Donors (including the UN system)	2	4	4	1	1	1	2
Private sector	5	5	2	4	3	3	4
Others	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

Source: Capacity Needs Assessment Survey 2012/2013.

Questions that arise from the information in Table 14 include:

- Do the ministries and donors demand research and/or information from these institutions/organizations? If so, what type? If not, why not?
- When they request information, do they receive it? If so, is it in the format required?
- Do the ministries and donors support these institutions/organizations financially and technically to generate and analyze information for policymaking?
- To what degree do the donors and ministries depend on outside sources for research information related to policymaking?

These questions are very relevant because unless there is effective demand for policy research information, it will not be generated and supplied.

By their own assessment, the different policy research and analysis institutions and organizations believe they are valuable sources of research data and statistics (Table 15). Some of them also do influence budget-making processes with respect to the food and agriculture sector. The NDPC, SRID, and PPMED specifically play significant roles in budget-making processes. However, only the NDPC has a system to hold the government accountable for implementing food and agricultural policies as indicated in Table 15. How effective this has been is debatable. There does not seem to be an effective way yet discovered by an organization to make governments and implementers accountable to the implementation or non-implementation of their policies and programs. Development partners, however, use the “trigger method” to hold governments accountable; it only works in situations where the development partners are major funders of a project or program. The democratic governance system also ensures that a government can be changed by the people’s votes during elections. Definitely performance and nonperformance will play a role in the people’s decisions to vote for anybody.

**TABLE 15: RESEARCH POLICY LINKAGE ACTIVITIES**

Institution/ Organization	A valuable source of research data and statistics?	Any influence on budget- making process with respect to food and agriculture sector?	Any impact on holding government accountable for implementing food and agriculture policies?
NDPC	Somewhat	Very much	Very much**
SRID	Very much	Very much	Somewhat
STEPRI	Very much	Not at all	Not at all
University agricultural economics departments	Somewhat	Somewhat	Not at all
ISSER, UG, Legon	Very much	Somewhat	Not much
IAR, UG, Legon	Very much	Not much	Not at all
PPMED of MOFA	Somewhat	Very much	Somewhat

Source: Capacity Needs Assessment Survey 2012/2013.

Note: \* = Answers to be chosen for each of the questions are: “Not at all,” “Not much,” “Somewhat,” and “Very much.” \*\* = Based on the annual progress report (APR). NDPC = National Development Planning Commission; SRID = Statistics, Research and Information Department; STEPRI = Science and Technology Policy Research Institute of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research; ISSER = Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (University of Ghana); IAR = Institute for Agricultural Research (University of Ghana); PPMED of MOFA = Programme Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Department of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture.

According to all the agricultural policy research and analysis institutions and organizations themselves, they have all received requests for policy advice. Indeed, some staff had played the role of policy advisors, which indicates that there has been some demand for policy research information but it seems to have been just once in a while (Table 16). They have also been involved in supplying food and agriculture related policy information in the form of documents and other analytical products, but the feeling is that the supply should be more demand-driven. Routine data collection and analysis (for example by SRID) is important and has an important role to play. For policymaking, however, more focused information needs to be sought.

**TABLE 16: EVIDENCE-BASED POLICYMAKING**

Has the organization/institution or a member:	NDPC	SRID	STEPRI	University Agricultural Economics Departments	ISSER, Legon	IAR, Legon	PPMED of MOFA
1. Played specific role as policy advisor?	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
2. Had any request for policy advice on food and agriculture related issues?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
3. Been involved in developing food and agriculture related policy/strategy/documents in the past 5 years?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
4. Produced research and analytical products to be used in the development of food and agriculture programs or projects in the past 5 years?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Source: Capacity Needs Assessment Survey 2012/2013.

With regards to dissemination of policy research findings, personal contact with government and other officials; presentations of documents to officials; and roundtable discussions with stakeholders, officials, and the press are the main methods used (Table 17). Personal contact and roundtable discussions are quite effective if most of those attending will be directly responsible for implementation are part of the processes. Very often the personal contacts are not made to these people and even roundtable discussions, especially involving the press, do not usually involve people who will ask critical questions.

Table 17 also indicates that policy briefs and newsletters are not used much as tools for policy information dissemination. It has, however, been found that catchy policy briefs and newsletters convey information much better to busy politicians and policymakers. It is usually better to produce these and distribute them during the personal contacts and roundtable discussions. Bulky documents presented to officials are often left on the shelves while discussions based on policy briefs and newsletters occur more often. The production of policy briefs and newsletters, however, need expert knowledge and skill in writing and presenting the contents and in designing the briefs and newsletters. Capacities have to be built in these areas. Also the funding requirements for the production of policy briefs and newsletters are quite high and it will not be easy convincing government and other officials to allocate funds for these tasks. Already there are hardly any funds for research so adding to the production of policy briefs and newsletters to research budgets may signal the complete cessation of funding for research. It might also show that research information that is not disseminated and used is virtually useless and a waste of resources.

**TABLE 17: USE OF COMMUNICATIONS TOOLS FOR DISSEMINATION OF POLICY RESEARCH FINDINGS**

Communications Tools	Percentage of Policy Research/Analysis Institutions/Organizations Using Tools to Communicate Research Findings
1. Personal contact with officials	100
2. Small roundtable discussion with officials and key stakeholders	85.7
3. Public roundtable with officials and press	71.4
4. Newsletters to officials	28.6
5. Policy briefs to officials	42.9
6. Presentation to officials	85.7
7. Press-conference and panel discussion	28.6
8. Work with media to influence government	14.3

Source: Capacity Needs Assessment Survey 2012/2013.




## 6. ASSESSMENT OF POLICY PROCESS: INSTITUTIONAL AND CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS

### 6.1. Network Map of Major Decision-Makers in Agriculture and Rural Development

Figure 1 is a map of key agricultural policy institutions and organizations. They may be divided broadly into the agricultural policy research and analysis institutions, policy process institutions, and development partners as presented in Table 1 (Chapter 2). The main policy process institutions include MOFA management, the different relevant departments of the agriculture sector ministries (as detailed in Table 1), NGOs/CSOs, farmer organizations and associations, the private sector, private sector organizations, including the finance organizations, labor unions, development partners, and others. All these organizations have strengths and weaknesses for policy research information and the implementation of policies, projects, and programs.

**FIGURE 1: INSTITUTIONAL MAP OF KEY AGRICULTURAL POLICY INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS**



Source: Author.

Note: METASIP SC = Medium Term Agriculture Sector Investment Plan Steering Committee; SAKSS = Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support Systems; GIDA = Ghana Irrigation Development Authority; SADA = Savanna Accelerated Development Authority; ISSER = Institute of Statistical,

## 6.2. Policy Analysis Results, M&E Data, and Other Information

As discussed earlier, a number of policy process organizations do approach policy research and analysis institutions for information and advice. There is no formal or organized way to do this, however, except in the case of SRID, where basic agricultural statistics must be updated annually. ISSER has also taken the task of producing *the State of the Ghanaian Economy* annually through an International Development Research Centre (IDRC) grant. MOFA management is not known to regularly demand policy research results, except when donors or development partners insist and threaten to pull funding. MOFA and other agriculture policy process organizations, including development partners, need to establish a mechanism to collect and store as much information as is practical so that it can be used when required.

With regards to the use of policy research results, M&E data, and other information, it is difficult to know the degree of use partly because the data and information is scanty and also because several people do not seem to have confidence in the data. A number of agricultural projects however depend on M&E results to make necessary adjustments.

## 6.3. Constraints Impeding Design and Implementation of Investment Plans

There are several constraints that hinder the design and implementation of investment plans, and the METASIP is no exception. A major constraint is the lack of a clear strategic direction and vision. The political leadership and top policymakers are expected to give a clear idea of what the vision of the agriculture sector is or how to partake in roundtable discussions that will come up with such a vision. Unfortunately, the ministers, their deputies, and the chief directors hardly ever take part in any serious policy discussions. The best they do is read opening speeches and leave only to sometimes disagree with decisions arrived at. The political leadership must be involved in policy discussions to understand the background behind policy suggestions from researchers and analysts.

Availability of reliable data and evidence-based information is another major constraint to the design and implementation of investment plans. Neither the GSS nor SRID is adequately resourced to collect the data and information required to produce an evidence-based investment plan. Research studies and information collected outside these organizations do not also usually produce most of the required information, and, even if they do, the knowledge management system is not good enough for the investment planner to know that it exists. Much research on Ghanaian agriculture has been conducted without the results presented in Ghana and with no document deposited in any institution or organization in Ghana. There is an urgent need to establish a robust knowledge management and dissemination structure to harness all agricultural related research studies in the country to aid in evidence-based decision-making and planning.

A third major constraint is poor and inconsistent funding of agricultural policy research and analysis, institutions, and organizations as well as logistics that will allow them to undertake investment planning with minimum stress and timeliness. The production of the METASIP could have been done within a year instead of three years with adequate and consistent funding arrangements.

Quality and commitment of personnel for investment planning may be regarded as another serious constraint. Several people that are usually drafted to take part in investment planning either do not have the knowledge or skills

or are not committed to the process. The lack of knowledge and skills can be addressed by effective capacity building prior to the investment planning process; the lack of commitment may be addressed by motivation of various types.

## 7. CAPACITY STRENGTHENING STRATEGY FOR GHANA SAKSS

### 7.1. Capacity Strengthening Activities and Responsibilities of Individuals and Organizations

The analysis of information obtained from several stakeholders and presented in this report clearly points to the need to streamline the Ghana SAKSS' structure in order to undertake the tasks of coordinating a system (or systems) for information generation, M&E, and knowledge management. Streamlining will also allow for continuous analysis of constraints and challenges confronting the agriculture sector.

#### 7.1.1. Location of the SAKSS Node

SAKSS is about strategic agricultural policy analyses and knowledge systems. It is thus necessary that the node be located in an environment with some degree of research orientation or such an environment should be created. Since there is a need to streamline SAKSS activities within MOFA (since MOFA is the lead of the agriculture sector), the SAKSS Secretariat should be located at the PPMED of MOFA but with considerable independence and diverse sources of direct funding to enable it to function autonomously. Such an arrangement will enable the Secretariat to harness expertise from the universities and research institutions within and outside the country as well as other ministries and NGOs. It is important to state that the SAKSS Secretariat should be coordinated by somebody with a research orientation who relates closely to institutions within the country.

#### 7.1.2. Capacity Strengthening Strategy

The SAKSS Secretariat will coordinate all SAKSS activities and play a particularly central role linking the METASIP Steering Committee to the thematic groups. The SAKSS Secretariat must, for example, be a center for the collation of information from the SAKSS thematic groups for the METASIP Steering Committee and to obtain research and other issues from it for research institutions, universities, the thematic groups, and other interested groups.

The following are other specific activities that should be undertaken as part of the capacity strengthening strategy.

1. There is a need for a register of agricultural policy researchers and analysts that indicates their skills and competencies in the various institutions and organizations in the country.
2. There is also a need to streamline the "demand organizations and agencies," that is those requesting research studies to inform policy dialogue and decisions. What data and information is demanded and by whom?
3. A major recommendation from the interaction with stakeholders has been the need for a long-term agricultural investment plan that entire nation will subscribe to and that generally will not change with government shifts. Even though one has reason to be skeptical about such a plan, it is useful to fully debate it and arrive at any next steps. The METASIP may be regarded as a medium-term plan, and it has not had any serious opposition. Its implementation has been a problem mainly because politicians are too much focused on short-term unsustainable results.
4. The plan to bridge the human capacity gap should be short, medium, and long term. Skills development of existing policy research personnel should be pursued as a short-term measure. Also, assistance from other

parts of the continent in specific areas of policy research and analysis can be undertaken in the short term. In the medium to long term, there is a need to train young and promising agricultural economists up to the PhD level in policy research and analysis, knowledge management, and M&E. General training in agricultural economics is not enough for the tasks to be pursued. It was also suggested that agricultural policy analysis concepts and issues should be part of the curricula of agricultural faculties of universities since even agricultural extension agents (AEAs) also need to have some policy discussion and dialogue skills to communicate effectively at the district and zonal levels.

5. Funding and provision of facilities are very critical to any strengthening strategy. A sustainable funding mechanism has to be put in place to ensure success of the SAKSS initiative. Agriculture is vital for our existence, and nobody doubts the key role of the CAADP process in African agricultural development. It is thus important that the SAKSS agenda is made financially secure.
6. There is a great need for improved governance at the sector level that encourages self-criticism, innovativeness, and different points of view by staff at regular review meetings. As indicated by some respondents, many meetings are talk shops that repeat the same stories.
7. A platform must be created for regular discussions of the agriculture sector by the relevant ministers, deputy ministers, chief directors, and members of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Food and Agriculture.

### **7.1.3. Specific Capacity Building Activities**

The following specific capacity building activities are crucial for the whole CAADP process, especially the implementation of METASIP.

1. Contract staff (competent consultants) should be engaged over the long term to help build capacities in various areas because sustainable capacity building cannot be achieved over two days or even at a one-week workshop.
2. Capacity building of regional and district personnel in agricultural policy discussions and dialogue is needed.
3. Capacity building of farmer-based organizations and associations with good governance is needed because too many of these organizations are autocratic and thus the farmers have virtually no voice.
4. All categories of staff involved in data collection and analysis, knowledge management, and M&E should be trained and regularly updated in the use of analytical computer software.

### **7.1.4. Other Major Activities**

1. The various thematic groups have been undertaking stocktaking exercises of available knowledge systems that have been created through research. These exercises must be analyzed and put to use.
2. Commissioned research through the competitive grant process will greatly assist SAKSS in providing sound evidence-based information.
3. There is a need to collate various agricultural related research studies from within and outside of Ghana, review them, and use what's relevant.


4. Produce policy briefs based on research and new findings in concise formats that policymakers are most likely to read and put to use.
5. The METASIP Steering Committee needs to have one or more technical persons to assist in collecting and analyzing information, in order to make them effective in their bid to get the METASIP implemented.
6. The METASIP Steering Committee members need a lot of capacity building in various areas—especially those related to basic agricultural knowledge—in order to enable them to make informed decisions.

## 7.2. Capacity Strengthening Work Plan for Ghana SAKSS

There has been a very strong political commitment by Hon. Minister of Food and Agriculture Mr. Clement Humado to strengthen the SAKSS and support the METASIP Steering Committee to fulfill its role. In particular, he is committed to establishing a relatively independent SAKSS Secretariat, which will be based at the PPMED of MOFA but independent enough to fulfill its mandate. It will be led by a research-oriented manager and will be supported with facilities and equipment (as much as possible). It is hoped that the SAKSS Secretariat will be given its own fund allocation and an account for donors’ financial contributions, which can be monitored separately.

A comprehensive capacity strengthening work plan can only be launched after the Secretariat is established. Figure 2 is represents a potential Ghana SAKSS operational and governance structure. The political leadership has to take keen interest in the SAKSS in order for it to function effectively in a system that is quite adverse to change.

**FIGURE 2: POTENTIAL GHANA SAKSS OPERATIONAL AND GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE**



Source: Author.

Note: METASIP SC = Medium Term Agriculture Sector Investment Plan Steering Committee; CSIR = Council for Scientific and Industrial Research; NDPC = National Development Planning Commission; SRID = Statistics, Research and Information Department; PPMED = Programme Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Department of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture.

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## APPENDICES

### Appendix 1: Inception Workshop Materials

Inception Workshop presentation by Mr. Manson Nwafor, economist, International Institute of Tropical Agriculture:  
Inception Meeting: Capacity Strengthening Strategy through Capacity Needs Assessment for Country SAKSS

The slide features a dark green header with the ReSAKSS logo and 'West Africa' text. Below the header, the title 'Inception Meeting: Capacity Strengthening Strategy through Capacity Needs Assessment for Country SAKSS' is centered in a light green area. A horizontal orange line is positioned below the title. The author's name and affiliation are listed at the bottom of the slide.

ReSAKSS<sup>WA</sup>  
West Africa  
Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System

# Inception Meeting: Capacity Strengthening Strategy through Capacity Needs Assessment for Country SAKSS

Objectives and Methodology

By  
Manson Nwafor  
Policy Analyst  
ReSAKSS WA  
IITA

The slide has a dark green background with a white title at the top. Below the title, there is a list of four bullet points. The third bullet point is highlighted in yellow. At the bottom, there is a footer with the text 'Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System – West Africa' and 'Page 2'.

## Main Objective of The Assessment

- SAKSS is needed to ensure successful METASIP implementation.
- It is necessary to ensure that the SAKSS has the capacity to carry out its functions.
- Hence the need to assess and strategize on how to improve and/or better utilize existing capacity.
- Ghana-SAKSS can use the capacity strengthening strategy as an input in its 2013 work plan

Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System – West Africa Page 2

## Methodology

- Stakeholders' leadership: inception meeting, steering committee, validation workshop
- National consultant supported by IFPRI and ReSAKSS WA
- 2 generic Africa wide questionnaires
- Interviews/discussions
- Literature review

## Key Tasks

- Assess the existing capacity for strategic analysis, investment planning, knowledge management, M&E – includes **individual level capacities** [Survey form for organizations Questionnaire ++]
- Assess the **organizational capacity** for strategic analysis, investment planning, knowledge management, M&E – includes data availability, soft and hardware availability, financing, etc [Survey form for organizations Questionnaire ++]
- Assess the **capacity of the policy process** – identify institutional gaps that may weaken the policy process – particularly as it relates to basing policies, plans, programs and projects on reliable evidence [Capacity Assessment of the Policy Process Institutions Questionnaire++ ]

## Structure of the Questionnaires

	<b>Organizations Questionnaire</b>	<b>Policy Process Institutions Questionnaire</b>
1	Focus and strengths of organization	Focus and strengths of institution
2	Human resources	Level of effective leadership in the policy process
3	Financial resources	Capability to adapt, learn, and self-renew - Level of effective application of M&E
4	Physical resources	Capability to deliver on mandate and development objectives
5	Research-policy linkage	Level of engagement of organization in networks, alliances, and collaborative efforts
6	Evidence Based Policy making	Existence of mechanisms for coherence in the food and agricultural sector
7	Statistical, M&E questions	
8	Constraints and solutions in key areas	
9	Policy making capacity	

## Timetable

- Total duration for Ghana work is 3 Months

	Activities/Deliverables	Dates
1	Africa wide capacity building (About 9 countries)	April 2012
2	Pilot test of the assessment (Ethiopia)	3 <sup>rd</sup> quarter 2012
3	Inception meeting for Ghana	October 2012
4	Field work (including pre-testing and meetings with the steering committee)	October/ November 2012
5	Needs assessment report	November 2012
6	Baseline report	December 2012
7	Draft Capacity strengthening strategy and full report	December 2012
8	Validation workshop	December 2012
9	Final Capacity strengthening strategy and full report	December 2012

Thank You For Your Attention

## Appendix 2: METASIP Steering Committee Members, Secretariat, and SAKSS Coordinators

Stakeholder Group	Name and Institution
Traditional Rulers <b>(Chairperson)</b>	Odeneho Gyapong Ababio II, Sefwi Bekwaihene, National House of Chiefs, Kumasi
Parliament	Dr. Alhassan Mohamed Yakubu, Chairperson, Parliament Select Committee on Agriculture and Cocoa Affairs, Accra
DP ASWG	Jan Nijhoff , World Bank, Ghana
FBOs	John Awuku Dziwornu, Ghana National Association of Farmers and Fishermen, National Secretary
CSO FOODSPAN	Daniel Oberko
CSO GAWU	Kingsley Ofei-Nkansah, General Agriculture Workers Union (GAWU), General Secretary
Private sector	Marjorie Abdin, Federation of Association of Ghanaian Exporters (FAGE), Vice President
CSIR	Dr. Kofi Fening, Director, Soil Research Institute, CSIR, Kumasi
University of Ghana, Legon	Prof. S.K Ofei, Dean of College of Agriculture and Consumer Sciences, University of Ghana, Legon
Agriculture Development Bank	Dr. Henry Alhassan
NDPC	J. E. Odotei, Director Policy, NDPC, Accra
MOFEP	Attn: Frimpong Kwateng Amaning Economic Research & Forecasting Division
MOFA <b>(Convener)</b>	Maurice Tanco Abisa Seidu, Chief Director MOFA
PPMED, MOFA	George Ashiabi, Director PPMED
PPMED, MOFA	Lena Otoo, Deputy Director
PPMED, MOFA	Daniel Ohemeng Boateng, Deputy Director
PPMED, MOFA	Lambert Abusah, Deputy Director
PPMED, MOFA	Josephine Quagrainie, Senior Agriculture Economist

Stakeholder Group	Name and Institution
SRID, MOFA	Sidney Oko Bampoe, Senior Agriculture Economist
PPMED, MOFA	Zalia Zempare, Deputy Director
WIAD, MOFA	Paulina Addy, Deputy Director
PPRSD, MOFA	Ruth Woode, Deputy Director
CSD, MOFA	Delali Kofi Nutsukpo, Deputy Director
DAES, MOFA	Justice Amoah, Deputy Director
PPMED, MOFA	Angela Dannson, Deputy Director

## Appendix 3: Capacity Needs Assessment for Ghana SAKSS Inception Workshop Participants

WORKSHOP DATE: OCTOBER 9, 2012

Name	Organization	Designation
Manson Nwafor	ReSAKSS WA, IITA	Policy Analyst
Matilda Steiua- Asalu	NFS Dept. University of Ghana	Nutritionist/HOD
Shashi Kolavalli	IFPRI	
K. Otei- Nkensol	GAWU	GS/GAWU
Lambert Abusah	MOFA	Deputy Director
Nicholas Neeguayo	MOFA	Deputy Director
Kingsley K. Amookos	MOFA	S.A.O.
John Awuku Dziworwu	GFAP/GNAFF	National Sec.
Johnson Achemdey	GFAP/GNAFF	Assembly member
Saa Dittoh	UDS, Tamale	SAKSS consultant
Jeremy Opoku Agyemang	PPMED/MOFA	Agriculture Economist
Josephine Iuy Quagraine	PPMED/MOFA	S. A. E
Pauline Addy	WIAD/MOFA	Deputy Director
Sidney Nii Oko Bampoe Addo	SRID	Asst. Director
Shaibu Muniru	Extension	Agriculture Officer
Ruth Woode	PPRSD	Deputy Director
Zalia Zempare	PPMED/MOFA	Deputy Director
J. E Odotei	NDPC	Director Policy
Marjorie Abdin	PEF/FAGE	METASIP SC

## Appendix 4: Capacity Needs Assessment for Ghana SAKSS Validation Workshop Participants

WORKSHOP DATE: APRIL 15, 2013

Name	Organization	Designation
Saima Zaman	IFPRI	Country Coordinator
Matilda Steiner Aseidu	NFD/UOG	Head of Department
Dorothy Effa	MOFA/ PPMED	SAO
Nicholina B. Kotei	PPRS/MOFA	SAO
Paulina Addy	WIAD/MOFA	Deputy Director
Neils Bossen	IFAD	ACPM
Lambert Abusah	MOFA/PPMED	Deputy Director
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# ReSAKSS

Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System  
Facilitated by IFPRI 

Established in 2006 under the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), the Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System (ReSAKSS) supports efforts to promote evidence and outcome-based policy planning and implementation as part of the CAADP agenda. In particular, ReSAKSS provides data and related analytical and knowledge products to facilitate benchmarking, review and mutual learning processes. It is facilitated by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), in partnership with the African Union Commission (AUC), the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA), and leading regional economic communities (RECs). At the regional level, ReSAKSS is supported by three Africa-based CGIAR centers: the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) in Kenya, International Water Management Institute (IWMI) in South Africa, and International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) in Nigeria. [www.resakss.org](http://www.resakss.org).

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